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I. INTRODUCTION: A BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Manufacturing anti-personnel landmines is a business activity
designed to accomplish the same fundamental goal as any other
business—to maximize profits. Landmine producers have always
tried to sell their products for a profit in a competitive market. They
have carefully researched and designed their products to maximize
effectiveness and to minimize costs.
The producers’ efforts and this competitive business
1
environment contributed to making landmines extremely costeffective for buyers. Prices for some of the most popular and copied
2
models were as low as three dollars, about the same cost as a pack of
∗
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1
In this Article, the terms “landmines,” “mines,” or “APMs” refer to
anti-personnel landmines, as distinguished from anti-tank mines, water mines, or
unexploded ordnance. This usage is purely a matter of convenience. This Article
does not explore liability arguments for this latter group of weapons.
2
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY 56 (1993) [hereinafter
∗∗
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cigarettes or a McDonald’s Chicken McNugget Happy Meal. Unlike
these inexpensive, consumable products, however, landmines were
built to last, often beyond their original purpose, which may only be
measured in weeks or days. Decades after buyers deploy a landmine,
4
it can still function as effectively as the day it was made.
These selling features—effectiveness, low cost, and long life—
not only increased sales and profits, but also unfortunately took the
products beyond their intended use and directly caused an enormous
number of deaths, injuries, and economic losses for unintended
victims. Further, their proliferation and durability have left an
astonishing sixty to seventy million landmines still hidden
5
underground in as many as ninety-three countries. They remain a
DEADLY LEGACY]. Conventional landmines from Western countries range from as low
as $5.80 for a mine from Quimica Tupan, which is in Brazil; to $6.15 per unit for a
Valsella plastic, “non-detectable” mine from Italy; to $6.70 per unit for a Giat
Industry mine from Belgium. Id. at 56-57. Non-Western mines often sell at or below
the low end of this range, including less than $3.00 for the Chinese Type 72 mine.
Id. at 56. On the higher end, the popular Claymore mine—first developed in 1960
and the last mine produced in the U.S. without a self-destruct mechanism—sold
about ten years ago at $27.47 per unit. Id. at 56, 65-66. “An estimated seventy
percent of Claymores will remain effective for more than twenty years in any
climate”; they can kill “within a fifty-meter radius and may incapacitate within 100
meters.” Id. at 66. “The Claymore made up eighty percent of all U.S. landmine
exports during the 1980s.” Id. at 65. According to the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL), the lowest cost anti-personnel landmines can sell for as little
as $3 each. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, at http://www.icbl.org (last
visited Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with author). A United Nations report states that
average anti-personnel landmine prices range from $3 to $15 per unit including, for
example, a Brazilian model at $5.80, a Belgian model at $6.70, some Chinese models
at $3 to $4, and a U.S. sale of one million mines at a unit price of $11.21. See DEADLY
LEGACY, supra, at 62. One of the authors, interviewing a former soldier who laid
landmines during the Bosnian War, was told that some mines during that war could
be purchased for the equivalent of $0.60 each. Interview by Richard Murray with
Senad, a former Bosnian soldier in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, BosniaHerzegovina (Aug. 18, 1998). By comparison, the same U.N. report notes that some
of the more sophisticated anti-tank mines from the United States and Europe can sell
for thousands of dollars each.
Welcome to the United Nations, at
www.un.org/english/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) (on file with the author).
3
This comparison was confirmed by a survey conducted by the authors on
March 24, 2001 of prices at a Chicago area Walgreen’s drug store, where a pack of
cigarettes sold for $4.39, and a McDonald’s restaurant, where a Chicken McNugget
Happy Meal sold for $3.14.
4
Some experts estimate that landmines have an average life of 50 to 100 years.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EXPOSING THE SOURCE: U.S. COMPANIES AND THE PRODUCTION
OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES 6 (1997) [hereinafter EXPOSING THE SOURCE]; see also
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 66 (stating that approximately seventy percent of
U.S. Claymore landmines, one of the most widely produced landmines in the world,
“remain effective for more than twenty years in any climate”).
5
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAMS, TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY 4 (1999)
[hereinafter TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY] (asserting that ninety-nine countries are
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threat to kill or maim more innocent civilians, waste agricultural
land, and disrupt economic and social recovery in some of the
6
world’s poorest states.
In fact, before the average person can read this Article, a
landmine will explode because an innocent civilian—perhaps a
7
farmer or a child—will have accidentally come in contact with it. He
will be severely traumatized by the loss of a limb, burns, blindness,
8
deafness, shock, and/or infection. Emergency medical care, if
accessible, will be rudimentary by U.S. standards, and long-term
medical care and psychosocial therapy will likely be unavailable. He
will find it difficult or impossible to earn a living. He and his family,
9
who were likely struggling before the explosion, will be devastated.

This may seem to be another horrible and sad event that
occurred in a distant place, the unfortunate aftermath of a previous
burdened with uncleared antipersonnel landmines and unexploded ordinance
problems, and estimating the number of uncleared landmines at sixty to seventy
million); see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 3 (estimating 85 to 100 million
landmines deployed in at least 62 counties; id. at 10 n.15 (noting the similarities
between uncleared mines and unexploded ordinances).
6
Most recently, in an effort to assess worldwide progress at resolving the
landmine crisis, and specifically to monitor the implementation of the 1997 Mine
Ban Treaty, the ICBL has begun researching and publishing annual reports, the
“Landmine Monitor Reports.” See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ET AL., LANDMINE
MONITOR REPORT 1999: TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO
BAN LANDMINES (1999) [hereinafter MONITOR]; SHAWN ROBERTS AND JODY WILLIAMS,
AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF LANDMINES (1995)
[hereinafter ENDURING LEGACY]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INT’L SEC. OPERATIONS, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM
WITH UNCLEARED LANDMINES, A REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEMINING (1993)
[hereinafter HIDDEN KILLERS].
7
With a total of 26,000 victims annually, there is one landmine victim every
twenty minutes. See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3.
8
Id. at 8-9; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 4.
9
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 4; see also ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9.
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war that was little reported or understood in the United States. The
landmine, it might be assumed, was supplied by a radical or former
Communist government, or by some mysterious foreign arms
producer. Neither the event nor its causes seem to involve the
United States, although on a humanitarian level, there may be some
comfort in knowing that U.S. funds support various relief agencies
that will try to ease the suffering of this poor victim and his family.
The involvement of U.S. entities in this tragedy, however, might
shift U.S. perception of this event. What if that landmine was built in
Wisconsin or California, or its parts came from Illinois? What if the
producer was a well-known U.S. corporation, with its stock traded on
the New York Stock Exchange and an annual report that listed profits
generated, in part, from the sale of that landmine? What if that
corporation, when it had decided to participate in the landmine
industry, knew or should have known its product was more likely to
harm civilians after a war than combatants during the war? Further,
what if producers had known about an alternative design for their
products that could have greatly reduced the risk of such grievous
injuries to unintended victims yet still served the buyers’ needs?
What if producers, to achieve more sales and greater profits, chose
the cheaper and more dangerous product design?
In sum, this Article will discuss whether and how landmine
producers should be held legally liable when their products have
directly caused foreseeable, and possibly avoidable injuries to
innocent civilians. The Article will begin, in Part II, with a review of
the relevant facts and background, including statistics regarding the
size of the landmine industry, the entities that make up the industry,
and the innocent civilians who have been victimized by landmines.
Next, Part III will provide a legal discussion on the right of injured
civilians to recover damages for their losses, including a review of the
viability of the various available causes of action. Finally, Part IV will
offer a summary and conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT FACTS
In the 1990s, documentation on global landmine production,
trade, and use, and the resulting impact on innocent civilians finally
10
began to emerge. The discussion that follows includes a brief review
10

Most of this information, and its public dissemination, is largely due to the
extensive work of the ICBL and its component organizations. Much more
information regarding the history of the mine action movement and the formation
and continuing activities of the ICBL and related organizations is available through
the annual Landmine Monitor Reports and the ICBL itself.
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of the staggering numbers and life-altering injuries suffered by
innocent citizens who are the victims of the landmine crisis. More
importantly, however, it also catalogues some of the sources and
factors instrumental in creating this global crisis, thereby providing a
basis for the subsequent legal discussions.
A. The Landmine Industry and Trade
No one knows exactly how much money companies and
government agencies have made producing and distributing
landmines. It is estimated, nonetheless, that the trade has involved
11
billions of dollars.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, landmine
12
production totaled approximately five to ten million units per year.
Around the world, an estimated 100 companies and government
13
agencies competed for $50 to $200 million of annual business,
14
eventually designing more than 340 models of landmines and
selling an estimated 190 million units during the period from 1968 to
15
1993.
At the industry’s peak, no single entity could rely on landmines
as a primary product line because so many companies and agencies
16
were involved. In addition to competition, the fact that the cheapest
models dominated the market also limited a single entity’s ability to
17
rely solely on landmine production.
These “dumb” mines, so
named because they have no self-destruct or self-deactivation
18
mechanism, account today for virtually all of the sixty to seventy
million landmines hidden underground and the 250 million stored

11

While hundreds of millions of cheap landmines generated $3 to $15 each of
revenue, resulting in total revenues of over one billion dollars, the newer and more
sophisticated landmine models and systems involve considerably larger sums. For
example, one leading U.S. landmine producer and its subsidiary received $486
million in APM and anti-tank contracts between 1985 and 1995. United States
Department of Defense records show that Alliant Techsystems (Hopkins, Minnesota)
and its subsidiary, Accudyne Corporation (Janesville, Wisconsin), won contracts in
this amount for production. EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 3.
12
MONITOR, supra note 6, at 5; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 57.
13
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36.
14
Id.
15
MONITOR, supra note 6, at 5.
16
See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 35-37.
17
“Blast” landmines that explode from pressure are the most frequently
encountered landmines around the world. These fall into the category of so-called
“dumb” landmines. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 6.
18
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65-69. Prime examples of dumb landmines are
the Russian PMN, the Chinese Type 72, the U.S. Claymore, and similar landmines
based on the Claymore from other producers. Id.
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19

in warehouses.

B. Producers and Exporters
With profits near the billions and several hundred thousand
victims worldwide, the question becomes—what entities produced
and profited from the sale of these landmines? This question, not
surprisingly, is difficult to answer because of the complexity of the
industry, the large number of landmine producers, and the high rate
of landmine exportation.

During the past two decades, the landmine industry has become as
complex and international as most other major manufacturing
industries.
Typically, production involved several companies
including, those that supplied components and others that
20
completed assemblage. Approximately 100 private corporations and
19

MONITOR, supra note 6, at 11, 14-15. Stockpiles are not of immediate concern
for the purposes of this Article, but it should be noted that the 250 million figure is
based on data collected by the Landmine Monitor Report in 1999 and is far higher than
the previous common estimate of 100 million stockpiled landmines. These are
stored in 108 countries and, while the United States ranks fourth with eleven million
mines, it is well behind China, which has 110 million; Russia, which has sixty to
seventy million; and Belarus with tens of millions. Id. at 11. In one of the most
hopeful events since the enactment of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty itself, the Landmine
Monitor Report reported that although the total stockpile was much greater than
previously believed, the number of APM producers has dropped, more than twelve
million stockpiled mines have been destroyed, and, during 1998 and early 1999, no
large scale use of landmines was found even though there was not a concurrent
decrease in the level of armed conflict in the world. Id. at 11. The stockpiles are
predominantly dumb mines, and it must be hoped that they will either eventually be
destroyed, as contemplated in the Treaty, or at the least never deployed. For further
discussion on the destruction of landmine stockpiles, see Mary Wareham,
Antipersonnel Landmine Stockpiles and their Destruction: Landmine Monitor Factsheet,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1999).
20
This circumstance has caused some corporations, who are publicly identified
with landmine production, to object that they are being unfairly connected to
landmines since their role was limited to supplying components. EXPOSING THE
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government agencies, in fifty-nine countries, have contributed to the
production of landmines. Of that total, producers in thirty-four
21
countries exported their products around the world (see Table 1).

The leading landmine producers and exporters include the
United States, but only up until the mid-1980s; China; Italy; and the
22
former Soviet Union.
Of the sixty to seventy million currently
uncleared landmines, approximately nine to ten million originated in
23
the United States —a significant share considering fifty-nine
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 2. It should be noted that virtually every component of a
landmine is necessary to make it the product that is so dangerous to innocent
civilians.
21
The Landmine Monitor Report identifies fifty-nine current and former landmine
producing countries, and names thirty-four past exporters. See MONITOR, supra note
6, at 5-10; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36 (discussing “48 countries which
have manufactured more than 340 types of anti-personnel landmines”). It should be
noted that very few of the exporting countries suffer from concentrations of
uncleared landmines, just as most of those countries suffering the worst
concentrations have never exported or even produced landmines.
22
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36.
23
Based on estimates by the United States Department of State, just less than
fifteen percent of the uncleared landmines in the world originated in the United
States, equal to 9 to 10.5 million of the 59.7 to 69.4 million landmines currently
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countries have produced landmines.
The exportation process adds to the identification problem
because of its own complexities, often being conducted through
intermediaries.
In addition, to avoid regulations or public
opposition, some producers shifted production away from Western
24
countries, once again making identification more difficult.
Further complicating the identification task is the fact that
landmines have been a relatively small component of the highly
secretive arms industry. During the past decade, however, several
dedicated and persistent non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
have researched and published information about the landmine
25
trade.
For the purposes of this Article, producers can be divided into
three groups: foreign government agencies, foreign private
corporations, and U.S. corporations (see Table 2).
1. Foreign Government Agencies
Foreign government agencies include state factories and stateowned corporations primarily in communist or formerly communist
countries, including China, Russia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Vietnam, and the former Eastern Bloc. Although their landmine
products are well documented, little is known about the
manufacturing entities or their operations.
2. Foreign Private Corporations
More information is available about some larger and more wellknown foreign corporations. In 1993, The Arms Project, a division of
uncleared in the world. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 14; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra
note 2, at 62. Based on their field experience, some demining experts attribute to
the United States a greater percentage of uncleared landmines than does the State
Department’s estimates. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 62.
24
The United Nations reported that, as public opinion began to mount against
mines in Western countries, producers increasingly shifted assembly to local or
regional subsidiaries. See www.un.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2000). As an example,
the report noted that French and Italian producers had shipped their explosives to
Singapore for assembly there. Id. These subsidiaries were also used for credit,
financing, shipping and other aspects of manufacturing. Id.
25
Primary researchers and publishers include Human Rights Watch, Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Physicians for Human Rights, ICBL, and
some related organizations. Working both separately and cooperatively, these
organizations have published reports, which have been printed and often posted on
their websites, listing producers, exporters, their products, and sometimes facts from
procurement contracts or interviews with corporate leaders or spokespersons. See,
e.g., MONITOR, supra note 6; EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4; ENDURING LEGACY,
supra note 6; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2.
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Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights collaborated
to investigate and publish their findings in Landmines: A Deadly Legacy,
which includes a list of anti-personnel landmine types and, when
26
known, their specific producers.
3. U.S. Corporations
The United States was a leading world producer and exporter of
landmines during the 1960s and 1970s. It extensively used landmines
27
in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Between 1969 and 1992,
26

DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at app. 17 (charting anti-personnel landmine
types and their producers).
27
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 17. The entire industry actually developed first
with anti-tank mines after World War I, which were then used extensively during
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the United States exported at least 4.4 million landmines to thirty-two
28
countries. The United States has always led the world in its variety
of landmine types, offering thirty-seven models compared with most
29
other countries offering typically five to fifteen models.
Manufacturing of landmines in the United States took place in
30
twenty-three states.
In 1975, annual exports peaked at
approximately 1.4 million units, and then declined to very low
31
numbers by 1982 and thereafter.
After the Vietnam War, the United States continued to produce
and export “dumb” mines, but non-Western producers who could sell
their products cheaper than the generally higher priced U.S. models
World War II when they were often combined with anti-personnel mines (APMs). Id.
at 16. APMs were subsequently used on a large scale during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT, IN ITS OWN WORDS: THE U.S. ARMY AND
ANTIPERSONNEL MINES IN THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS 4, 7 (1997) [hereinafter IN
ITS OWN WORDS]. The high rate of American casualties from U.S. mines in those
wars raised strong debate about their military effectiveness. See, e.g., EXPOSING THE
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 8 n.18 (quoting retired Marine Corps Commandant General
Alfred Gray Jr. as arguing “[w]e kill more Americans with our mines than we do
anybody else. We never killed many enemies with mines . . . .”). An estimated ninety
percent of the mines and booby traps used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were
either United States made or included U.S. parts. Id. Sixty-five to seventy percent of
United States Marine Corps casualties in Vietnam were from mines and booby traps.
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 18. While maintaining its position as a leading
producer and exporter of conventional APMs, the Vietnam experience in particular
prompted the United States to increase its efforts at becoming the world leader in
landmine technology. For more detail, see IN ITS OWN WORDS, supra note 27.
28
Exports have included: 2.5 million landmines to Iran, 622,000 to Cambodia,
437,000 to Thailand, 300,000 to Chile, and 102,000 to El Salvador. MONITOR, supra
note 6, at 328; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65. American mines have been sold to
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, and other countries. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65;
see also MONITOR, supra note 6, at 328-29. Other purchasers of U.S. mines have
included: Australia, Belize, Brunei, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Indonesia, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Peru, the Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65.
29
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 54. After the United States, Italy has the
second largest variety of landmines with thirty-six models. Id.
30
According to Exposing the Source, companies receiving prime contracts from the
Pentagon for at least $1 million of landmine production between 1985 and 1995
were located in: Minnesota ($336 million), California ($164 million), Wisconsin
($150 million), Florida ($62 million), New York ($62 million), Pennsylvania ($51
million), Illinois ($45 million), Kansas ($22 million), Indiana ($20 million), New
Jersey ($18 million), Connecticut ($18 million), Alabama ($15 million), Iowa ($10
million), Ohio ($8 million), Tennessee ($8 million), Maryland ($5 million),
Michigan ($4 million), Texas ($4 million), and Virginia ($1 million). EXPOSING THE
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 13. This list does not include subcontractors. See id.
31
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 64, 105, 106.
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32

increasingly supplied this market.
United States producers then
turned their attention to the more lucrative “smart” mine technology
and production, and invested billions of dollars in corporate research
33
and development. These new systems often involved “scatterable”
models that could be dropped from aircraft or fired from artillery or
34
launchers. Specifically, the United States Department of Defense
spent $1.68 billion on scatterable landmine systems between 1983
35
and 1992, and stockpiled an estimated $5 billion worth of these
36
systems by 1993.

Although reliable NGOs have identified U.S. companies in the
landmine business, no information is available that can connect
specific companies to their respective market shares during the
highest period of U.S. use and export. Some U.S. corporations,
however, were identified in a 1993 report by Human Rights Watch

32

Id. at 38-39. By the early 1990s, the newer “scatterable” models were being
built in wholly private facilities, but reportedly the conventional landmines were only
being manufactured in the United States by private firms under contract to operate
government-owned facilities. Id. Conventional mine export sales efforts were made
almost entirely by non-Western producers, based on a survey of arms trade
advertising, brochures, and trade shows. Id. at 39.
33
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 8.
34
Id.
35
Id. at n.16; see also United States Army, Anti-Personnel Land Mine Procurement and
Production, at UNITED STATES ARMY INFORMATION PAPER (1992).
36
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 9.
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37

entitled, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy.
Human Rights Watch
continued its investigations after that 1993 report and, in 1997,
published “Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of
38
Antipersonnel Mines.” This report was able to provide more details
regarding the involvement of U.S. corporations in the landmine
industry as a result of more information from government and
private sources (see Table 3).
C. Intended Uses, Actual Uses, and Design of the Product
Landmines have provided a number of uses—from advancing
strategic military operations to targeting and terrorizing innocent
civilians—for their different buyers. For example, military landmine
buyers, including both regular and irregular armies, typically used
landmines for conventional military purposes. These purposes were
predominantly defensive and tactical, such as establishing a defensive
perimeter, slowing an advancing enemy army in order to facilitate a
39
retreat, and “channeling” the movement of enemy troops.
Landmines’ deterrent affects also benefited these buyers; the mere
threat of landmines alone was often enough to deny the passage
40
through or use of land.
Other, typically non-military buyers,
however, intentionally used landmines to injure and terrorize
civilians, depopulate regions, and cripple economic and social
structures. They targeted agriculture, transportation, and even
41
schools and water sources.
Whether or not landmine producers specifically knew how their
products would be used, they did know what the buyers wanted their
product to accomplish. Producers designed their products to kill or,
more effectively, severely maim people who then required others to

37

DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 72-73.
Id. at app. A.
39
ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 4
40
Id. at 4-5 (describing the military perspective on landmine use).
41
See Shawn Roberts, No Exceptions, No Reservations, No Loopholes, The Campaign For
The 1997 Convention on The Prohibition of the Development, Production, Transfer, and Use of
Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371,
375-76 (1998). These latter uses clearly violate the requirements of proportionality
and discrimination between military uses and civilian consequences under
international law. Nevertheless, whether or not such uses of the product conform
with established international laws, they mostly occurred during wars and armed
conflicts. The very idea of regulating warfare—agreeing to “acceptable” methods
and conditions for killing and wounding humans—is a relatively recent
phenomenon of civilization that, unfortunately, has not yet found either effective or
consistent enforcement. Further, in the use and misuse of landmines, the actors
were the armies. Id. at 376.
38
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42

care for them. Of course, none of these products could distinguish
between combatants and civilians, and most landmine producers
made no effort to reduce the threat to post-conflict civilians by
43
including simple and readily available mechanisms to self-destruct
or self-deactivate the landmines after a certain time period
reasonable for their intended uses.
Is it possible that most of the sixty to seventy million unexploded
landmines currently threatening civilians around the world could
have been manufactured to self-destruct within a few days or weeks
after their original military use? Such a safer alternative could have
avoided the vast majority of civilian injuries, as well as the associated
human suffering and medical costs. In addition, a host of other
direct and indirect landmine damages, including the economic and
societal costs due to the loss of land use, might have been greatly
reduced if self-destruct technology had been employed earlier.
Indeed, self-destruct technology has been available since the
early days of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, first to U.S.
44
landmine producers and shortly after to foreign producers.
Although these first mechanisms were relatively primitive, they did
not interfere with the landmines’ intended military uses. Some
experts might even argue that self-destruct landmines could have
enhanced U.S. military effectiveness in Vietnam because the U.S.

42

Examples of landmines designed specifically to maim but not kill include the
British Ranger scatterable mine, Spanish P-4-A, Swedish L1-11, United States M14,
and the Pakistani P4 MK2. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 22. Regarding this latter
model, a Pakistan Ordinance Factories brochure, “Technical Specifications for Mine
Anti-Personnel (P4 MK2),” states,
This mine has been designed with a view to disable personnel.
Operating research has shown that it is better to disable a man than to
kill him. A wounded man requires attention, conveyance and
evacuation to the rear, thus causes disturbances in the traffic lanes of
the combat area.
Also, a wounded person has a detrimental
psychological effect on his fellow soldiers.
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5.
43
For a discussion on the early availability of technology for self-destructing
landmines, see infra PART III.
44
The BLU 42/B mine included a primitive, electrical self-destruct mechanism
and was used by the United States in Vietnam in 1966, but was available as early as
1964. Interview with Mark Hiznay, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 8,
2001). This mine, usually dropped by aircraft in a cluster bomb, was also used in
Laos and Cambodia. Id. Another U.S. self-destructing landmine used in Vietnam
was the “gravel mine” which had a canvas casing and included a chemical selfdestruct mechanism. Id. Over time, two vials inside the mine would chemically
dissolve and neutralize the device. Id. This mine was also dropped from airplanes,
but its use was discontinued due to the difficulty of keeping the mines chilled prior
to their use. Id.

318

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:303

“dumb” landmine, which was taken by opposing forces and used
against U.S. troops, was the greatest single cause of U.S. casualties in
45
Vietnam.
The availability of self-destruct technology more than thirty-five
years ago, before the majority of the sixty to seventy million
46
landmines now threatening civilians were manufactured, raises an
obvious question: If that technology could have prevented so many
unintended civilian injuries and related costs, while still providing the
products’ intended military uses, why was this safer alternative largely
ignored? It is difficult to imagine that the marginal cost of including
self-destruct technology was prohibitive, especially when compared to
the easily foreseeable grievous injuries and immense costs from not
including any self-destruct technology.
D. Landmine Victims and Their Needs
“Landmine victims” include many individuals harmed in ways
other than direct injury from a landmine explosion. For instance,
landmine infestation has rendered enormous amounts of land useless
47
and those property owners have suffered economic loss.
Even
worse, such loss of useful land has displaced thousands of civilians,
48
who then may have become internally displaced citizens or refugees.
49
It also has deterred the return of others. Competition for mine-free
land can interfere with post-conflict resettlement efforts, as well as
50
cause over-grazing and even accelerate deforestation. The focus of

45

For example, in Vietnam during the year 1965, between sixty-five and seventy
percent of U.S. Marine Corps casualties were the result of landmines and booby
traps. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 18. Another report found that ninety percent
of all mine and booby-trap components used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were of
U.S. origin. EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 6. These and related data are
discussed more fully later in the “Government Contractor Defense” section of this
Article. See infra PART III.G.3.
46
The Enduring Legacy estimates that more than sixty-five million landmines were
laid during the period between 1980 and 1995. See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6,
at 3. After allowing for additional mines and demining since 1995, this estimate
indicates that the majority of the sixty to seventy million mines currently
endangering civilians were placed since 1980. No data is available on the
manufacturing dates for these mines, but presumably most were manufactured after
1964.
47
Accord Roberts, supra note 41, at 375-76.
48
Id. (discussing depopulation of entire geographic areas).
49
Even the threat of mines can displace civilians. As an example, in 1996 a
Mozambique village was abandoned by its entire population of 10,000 due to alleged
mine infestation. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 15. Subsequent demining efforts
uncovered a total of four landmines. Id.
50
ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 11.
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this Article, however, is civilian landmine victims who have suffered
personal injuries directly caused by landmines during post-conflict
periods.
The actual number of landmine victims in the world is unknown
at this time. Accurate data from affected countries is difficult to
obtain due to lack of funding as well as political or military
51
influences. Nevertheless, the number is very large. The United
Nations has estimated the total number of civilian landmine victims
at 300,000, and in 1994, reported the number of landmine-disabled
people, in particular amputee mine victims that require prosthetics
52
care, at 250,000. Landmine explosions causing injuries, sometimes
referred to as “incidents” or “events,” presently occur worldwide at a
rate of 26,000 per year, equal to about seventy each day or one every
53
twenty minutes.
These figures, in addition to being somewhat
dated, may underestimate the total because not all landmine injuries
are reported due to the remote locations of such events and other
54
factors.
Another complicating factor is the fact that these civilian victims
55
are located in many countries. Examples of some of the countries
with the worst landmine infestation and civilian impact include
Angola, where one in 334 inhabitants are amputees and roughly fifty
percent of the country is infested with an estimated six million
56
Many of these mines are concentrated around
mines.
infrastructure, schools, churches, water supplies, and healthcare
57
facilities. In Cambodia, littered with four to six million landmines,
one of every forty-five Cambodians are amputees and more than fifty
51

See MONITOR, supra note 6, at 24.
Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report to the Secretary-General, 49th Sess., Agenda
Item 22, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/49/357 (1994). In 1999, the Landmine Monitor Report
estimated the number of landmine survivors in the world at 300,000. MONITOR, supra
note 6, at 28.
53
This rate is the most commonly quoted from numerous sources but originated
with the United States Department of State. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 6, at 1; see
also ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3. In some subsequent instances the annual
rate of 26,000 is noted as referring to all injuries while other sources quote that
figure for the number of deaths and note that thousands of non-lethal injuries also
occur.
54
While recognizing that more accurate data may be very important for planning
and implementing victim assistance programs, this Article uses the estimate of
250,000 to 300,000 civilian landmine victims to approximate scale.
55
This is not surprising because landmines and other unexploded ordinance
currently are located in ninety-three countries. TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra
note 5, at 4.
56
Id. at 7.
57
Id.
52
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58

new casualties are added each month.
Central America’s most
mine-infested country is Nicaragua.
In that country, civilians
comprise eighty-five percent of all landmine injuries and eighty-seven
59
percent of landmine deaths. It should be noted that each of these
60
three countries is infested with U.S. mines and are all receiving U.S.
61
financial aid for demining efforts and victim assistance.
Landmine victims often suffer loss of limbs, burns, blindness,
deafness, and a wide variety of other physical injuries. Extensive
blood loss and infection are also common, in part, because landmine
explosions destroy blood vessels over large areas of the body and they
typically drive dirt, bacteria, clothing, and other foreign matter into
62
tissue and bone.
Reported death rates from landmine injuries
63
range from 3.7 percent to fifty-nine percent, depending greatly on
the type of mine, the delay between injury and emergency medical
64
care, and the quality of that medical care.
The delay for many landmine victims in reaching proper
medical care, which can be hours or even days, is an especially
aggravating circumstance.
Immediate evacuation and prompt
surgical care for landmine victims are critical to minimizing related
deaths and disabilities. Military personnel during a conflict may have
access to trained medics, helicopters, and well-equipped medical
facilities, but civilians injured by mines in post-conflict areas generally
do not have such support. A 1991 study conducted in Cambodia, for
example, found that injured civilians from rural areas waited an
average of twelve hours after their injuries to reach a hospital with
58

Id. at 18. It is worth noting that this new casualty rate is a marked reduction
from 1991 when Cambodia was suffering 300 to 700 amputations per month or an
annual amputation rate of about 1 per 1,500 Cambodians. Asia Watch & Physicians
for Human Rights, Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War, at HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH 36 (1991). By comparison, in 1989 the amputation rate in the United States
from all traumatic injuries was about 1 per 22,000 Americans. Eric Stover & Dan
Charles, The Killing Minefields of Cambodia, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 27.
59
MONITOR, supra note 6, at 274 (reporting a total of 423 civilian injuries versus
seventy-six military injuries, and a total of forty-six civilian deaths versus seven
military deaths).
60
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 104
61
TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 7, 18.
62
Id. at 121.
63
ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9. The International Committee of the Red
Cross reports a mortality rate of 3.7 percent for landmine victims at hospitals, but
households in Cambodia and Afghanistan have shown death rates of thirty-one
percent and fifty-nine percent, respectively, suggesting that many victims do not
reach hospitals and may never be reported.
64
See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9 (presenting country-specific mortality
rates and discussing heightened mortality for those victims who do not make it to a
hospital, as well as the often rudimentary first aid that victims receive).
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65

surgical care. In Angola, the average wait is reportedly thirty-six
66
hours.
Even if a civilian victim can reach a hospital, the available care
can be limited due to the lack of supplies, equipment, and skilled
personnel. Long-term care and therapy is even less likely. Countries
most severely affected by landmines can provide services for only
fifteen to twenty percent of the needs of the physically disabled, a
67
category encompassing more than landmine victims.
These
healthcare limitations inevitably lead to higher death rates and more
serious long-term physical handicaps for landmine victims.
Not surprisingly, the impact on children is the worst. Their
smaller bodies are less capable of surviving the extensive blood loss
associated with most landmine injuries. Loss of a limb for a growing
child also has greater ramifications. A child should receive a new
prosthesis every six months, compared with an adult’s needs of every
68
three to five years. This means that children who have lost limbs to
landmines may need in their lifetimes twenty to thirty or more
prostheses, which each cost approximately the average annual
69
income of an adult in their countries.

These types of facts only begin to tell the story, but landmine
victims’ fundamental needs are well established. First, landmine
victims need emergency medical care, surgeries, and physical
rehabilitation. Second, amputees need prosthetics, wheelchairs, and
65

DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 127.
Id.
67
INT’L TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, TO HEAL THE WOUNDS OF EARTH AND SOUL (1998).
68
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 130 (referring to estimates made by the
International Committee of the Red Cross).
69
Id.
66
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crutches. Additionally, most victims need psychosocial rehabilitation
and therapy, and many suffer from social stigmas in their cultures.
All victims need reintegration into their societies and assistance in
70
returning to productive lives. Most of these needs are long-term,
especially for the children.
The costs of fully providing for the needs of landmine victims is
difficult to ascertain. No accurate estimates are available. Of mineinfested countries investigated, “families reported having to spend
the equivalent of up to two-and-one-half times their annual income
71
on immediate costs related to the mine injuries.” This is consistent
with the ICBL estimate that landmine survivors’ basic needs would
average $9,000 per victim, which, when multiplied by its estimate of
300,000 victims, led to a call by the ICBL for $3 billion in worldwide
72
assistance for landmine victims. Restoring victims to productive lives
with proper long-term care, therapy, training, and social
reintegration, however, would arguably cost much more than these
estimates suggest.
In sum, approximately 250,000 to 300,000 landmine victims have
suffered grievous personal injuries that are often inadequately
treated, and approximately seventy more civilians around the world
are injured every day. Most victims experience permanent disability,
loss of income, disruption of their families, and social stigma. Very
few receive sufficient long-term care, rehabilitation services, or
vocational training. None of them are at fault for their injuries. The
financial cost of properly treating their injuries and caring for their
needs is unknown but almost certainly would be measured in billions
of dollars.
III. LEGAL LIABILITY FOR LANDMINE PRODUCERS UNDER UNITED
STATES LAW
A. Introduction
As discussed in Parts I and II, landmines have caused the serious
injury or death of hundreds of thousands of civilians around the
world. The injuries of civilians and their right to recover will be the

70

MONITOR, supra note 6, at 25.
ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9.
72
In April of 1998, the Victim Assistance Working Group of the ICBL, based on
its members’ own field experience and survey results from WHO, UNICEF, the
American Red Cross, and others, developed a matrix of various costs associated with
the basic medical and rehabilitative needs of landmine survivors to arrive at the
$9,000 figure. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 28.
71
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focus of the following legal analysis.
A landmine is no different than most other products—it is a
good supplied to others for use. Manufacturers of landmines should
be held liable, just as other manufacturers are held responsible and
accountable, for the dangerous condition of or defects in their
products. In order to compensate innocent civilian victims and
prevent future injuries, producers of landmines must take
responsibility for the damage their products have caused and
continue to cause. If they are held responsible and forced to
compensate individual victims for their injuries, it is likely that most
producers will discontinue production of landmines for fear of
lawsuits. Similarly, producers, faced with the possibility of endless
litigation given the millions of currently active landmines, may take
an active role in demining efforts.
Several causes of action, some stronger than others, could lead
to compensation for landmine victims. Several questions, however,
must be answered before these causes of action can be pursued by, or
on behalf of, the victims. These questions include the following: (1)
who are the potential plaintiffs; (2) will individual suits or class
actions be most appropriate; (3) who should be named as
defendants; (4) should the suits be brought in state or federal court;
and (5) what substantive law will govern the adjudication of these
claims? Resolving these and related questions will lead to a
determination of what kind of suit might be brought. Possible
approaches include products liability, strict liability, negligent
entrustment, and intentional tort. After determining the cause of
action, consideration turns to the form of relief, calculation of
damages, and available defenses.
B. Plaintiffs
1. Definition
Landmines directly and indirectly affect many persons. For the
purposes of this Article, however, landmine victims as potential
plaintiffs are defined as non-combatants who have suffered personal
injuries directly caused by landmine explosions during post-conflict
periods. In other words, the potential plaintiffs are civilians injured
by landmines that were manufactured without self-detonating
devices, also known as “dumb mines,” and then left in place after a
conflict had ended.
Excluded as potential plaintiffs are combatants and civilian
victims injured during period of conflict because certain defenses
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likely would bar their claims. Also excluded are persons who have
lost property or property value due to landmine infestation because
the nature of their claims varies too greatly from the personal injuries
suffered by the first defined group.
Nevertheless, even though this definition of potential plaintiffs
excludes those injured during military conflicts and those injured by
property damage, the number of potential plaintiffs remains very
large. As discussed above, it is estimated that landmine victims
73
number between 250,000 and 300,000. Further, the most accepted
estimate for new landmine injuries is a worldwide rate of 26,000 per
74
year, equal to about seventy each day or one every twenty minutes.
It can be expected, despite demining and landmine awareness
programs, that this rate will not significantly decrease in the near
future because approximately sixty to seventy million landmines
75
presently threaten civilians.
Further complicating the group of current and future landmine
victims as potential plaintiffs is the fact they are located in many
76
countries.
Although 100,000 U.S. citizens have been landmine
77
victims during the twentieth century, this Article assumes that all
potential plaintiffs are foreign nationals.
Finally, the potential plaintiffs suffer a wide range of injuries—
many of which may result in death—including loss of limbs, burns,
blindness, deafness, loss of blood, infection, and other physical
injuries in addition to psychological damage. Of course, death may
result from these injuries. This diversity in the nature and severity of
injuries could hinder a class action approach that requires
commonality of factual issues, although this effect might be lessened
by dividing the plaintiffs into subclasses, as discussed later in this
Article.
2. Class Action
Class action lawsuits are a viable option for landmine victims
because individual suits may become burdensome or take too much
73

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See id.
75
TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4.
76
See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that landmines are found in
sixty-four countries, primarily developing states); see also TO WALK THE EARTH IN
SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that ninety-three countries are affected by either
landmines or unexploded ordnance).
77
Harry N. Hambric & William C. Schneck, The Antipersonnel Mine Threat: A
Historical Perspective, Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cal., November 18-22, 1996, at 1.
74
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time and money to pursue. For example, one particular plaintiff
could represent other similarly-situated landmine victims without
each victim having to take an active role in the pursuit of litigation.
To bring a class action lawsuit, several requirements must be
met. In federal court, there are four prerequisites under Rule 23(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and three requirements
under Rule 23(b)(3). First, under Rule 23(a), there must be a
sufficient number of class members so as to render joinder of all
78
members “impracticable.” Second, common questions of law or fact
79
must exist. Third, the class member who acts as the representative
must “‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the
80
class members.” Finally, the class representative must be able to
81
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
To bring a class action, a class also must meet the requirements
82
83
84
of 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). Because landmine victims would seek
monetary damages as their predominate form of relief, Rule 23(b)(3)
is the most appropriate class device. Therefore, common questions
of law or fact must “predominate over any questions affecting only
85
individual [class] members.”
Second, the class action must be
86
superior to all other possible methods of litigation. Finally, there
87
can be no undue management difficulties in bringing a class action.
The requirements of Rule 23 will probably only be met in the
case of landmine victims if class members are divided into smaller
78

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
Id.
80
East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)
(internal citation omitted).
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
82
Id. at 23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(1) allows certification of a class when “the
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class . . . .” Id. at 23(b)(1)(A). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows
certification where “adjudications with respect to individual members of the class . . .
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests . . . .” Id. at 23(b)(1)(B).
83
This part of the Rule allows certification where “the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole . . . .” Id. at 23(b)(2). The merit of this part of the
rule as applied to landmine victims will be discussed below.
84
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 23(b)(3).
87
Id. at 23(b)(3)(D).
79
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groups according to location or perhaps type of injury. There are
more than 300,000 victims all over the world and, therefore, one
88
large class would probably not be certified.
It is likely that the
prerequisites under Rule 23(a) could be met, but 23(b)(3) creates
problems primarily because a class of people around the world would
ensure significant management difficulties that a court could
89
consider undue. Likewise, it is questionable whether a class action
would be considered superior to all other methods since individual
actions would be easier to manage.
A solution to this problem would be to divide the large number
of victims into multiple subclasses. To do this, it would be necessary
to look to a specific geographical area where a particular producer is
known to have shipped landmines. This would establish a discrete
area where the tort took place. Victims in that area could be
organized and more easily notified of the suit. As long as there are a
sufficient number of plaintiffs to satisfy the numerosity requirement
under Rule 23(a), the other class certification requirements would
likely be met. Since all plaintiffs would live in one geographical area
and were injured by the same landmines, common questions of law
or fact would exist. Also, one particular victim would presumably
have the same interests and injury as the other victims in that area,
thus enabling him to represent the class fairly and adequately.
Finally, common questions of fact or law would predominate such a
subclass, rendering the class action mechanism superior to all other
methods of litigation. Dividing the hundreds of thousands of victims
into subclasses would, therefore, allow for an efficient and speedy
resolution.
3. Associational Representation
A final consideration regarding class actions is whether a nongovernmental organization could bring a suit on behalf of landmine
victims. “An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
88

See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (rejecting a
nationwide class for asbestos claimants because individual issues predominated over
common issues).
89
In Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., the Fifth Circuit refused to certify a
nationwide class because of “difficult choice of law determinations, . . . Erie guesses,
notice to millions of class members . . . .” 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996). But see In
re “Agent Orange,” in which the court allowed television ads and media publicity to
serve as notice to thousands of class members. In re “Agent Orange” Product
Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The class here may not be
as big as the one in Castano, but the location of the potential plaintiffs, as well as their
location in poor, technologically deprived countries would make notice especially
problematic.
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members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the
organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the
90
lawsuit.”
No current NGO is suitable for the purpose of representing
landmine victims in such a legal action; however, if one were created,
it would need to carefully define the relief sought through its action.
If an NGO requested relief involving individual monetary
compensation, some participation by the individual members would
be necessary, therefore precluding the NGO from representing these
individuals.
On the other hand, an NGO might succeed with an associational
representation approach if it limited its request to funding for a
global trust fund in support of other NGOs and agencies that, in
91
turn, would provide care and support for landmine victims.
In
terms of standing, management, and effectively representing
landmine victims’ interests, an associational representation approach
through a specially formed NGO—possibly tied to a global trust
fund—offers an intriguing alternative beyond the scope of this
Article, but worthy of future investigation.
C. Defendants and Personal Jurisdiction
The range of potential defendants in landmine litigation is very
broad, at least partially, because landmine production and the chain
of distribution have involved a constellation of many entities in a
92
number of the world’s states. Where the plaintiffs file their suit,
however, will determine whom they can sue because a court must

90

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000). It should be noted that most cases of this type have involved special interest
organizations, such as environmental groups, or labor unions.
91
The concept of a global trust fund for landmine victims is not new and various
ideas are currently under study by several mine action NGOs. Nevertheless, the
purpose of this Article is to explore compensation theories for landmine victims
under U.S. law rather than the possible distribution and administration of funds for
the benefit of the victims. Although a global trust fund might provide a useful
vehicle within the context of an associational representation approach, this Article
takes no position on the trust fund concept itself.
92
It should be noted that in all potential defendant categories discussed in this
Article, whether governmental or private, the term “landmine producers” includes
the entire universe of entities involved in landmine production and the chain of
distribution, from component suppliers through assemblage and final delivery to the
buyers.
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have personal jurisdiction over each named defendant in the case.
This means that a defendant is only subject to jurisdiction in those
94
places it could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court . . . .”
The three basic conditions that render personal jurisdiction are
95
96
Victims of
actual presence, domicile, and business activity.
landmine explosions could bring lawsuits against defendants in states
where a producer is incorporated, where it has its primary place of
97
business, or where it conducts continuous and systematic business.
The litmus test is whether a defendant has such minimum contacts in
a forum state that the court, by exerting its jurisdiction over that
defendant, does not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
98
substantial justice.’”
1. Potential Categories of Defendants
Landmine victims can look to five categories of potential
defendants. First, they could sue the producers of the particular
99
landmines that injured them. This case would be brought in a state
where the defendant was domiciled, actually present, or conducting
business.
Second, in the more likely event that a plaintiff could not
identify which specific landmine producer was responsible for his
injuries, he could name multiple defendants under an enterprise
100
liability theory.
This presents a significant problem, however,
because defendants’ products cause harm outside the United States.
A landmine liability case is not like most products liability cases in
which the product either causes harm in the state where the case is
eventually brought or where it is placed into the stream of U.S.
interstate commerce. Landmines are not manufactured and used in
101
the same place.
In fact, they are not used in the United States at
102
all.
Rather, they are either manufactured by one company and
93

See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
94
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
95
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
96
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
97
See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
98
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S at 316.
99
A producer who contracts with the U.S. government to produce some military
item may be protected by the government contractor defense, which will be
discussed thoroughly below. See infra PART III.G.3.
100
For further discussion on the enterprise liability theory, see infra PART III.F.1.a.
See also Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980).
101
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 9.
102
Id.

2003

COMPENSATING LANDMINE VICTIMS

329

then shipped overseas for use, or their components are
manufactured separately by many companies, assembled in another
103
place, and finally shipped overseas for use.
It is unlikely that a
single court would have personal jurisdiction over all potential
defendants in a case like this. Therefore, unless a defendant waives
personal jurisdiction, which would be highly unusual, it would be
nearly impossible to name many defendants from many different
states in one federal court proceeding. A possible solution to this
problem could be to file many different suits in the appropriate fora
and subsequently request that all cases be transferred to the judicial
104
panel on multidistrict litigation for pretrial purposes.
Though
these cases would be remanded to the court in which they were
originally filed, all discovery and pretrial tasks would be performed in
a central location leading to a more efficient and economical
resolution.
Third, a plaintiff could attempt to sue all companies in the chain
of distribution of a particular landmine in order to encompass all
component part makers.
Again, the personal jurisdiction
requirement makes this very difficult to accomplish in a single action.
A separate lawsuit likely would have to be filed against each
defendant in the appropriate forum.
Fourth, a plaintiff could sue the government that contracted
105
with the producer to make the landmine.
This option presents a
host of problems regarding governmental immunity for the United
States and foreign sovereign immunity for other governments. These
are not personal jurisdiction problems, but rather are defenses that
106
will be discussed in detail later in this Article.
103

Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(c)(i) (West 2002). For this to occur, the action must be
civil, there must be one or more common questions of fact, and the actions must be
pending in different districts. Id. at § 1407(a).
105
Suing the U.S. government under this theory raises the defense of sovereign
immunity, which will be discussed in the defenses section below. See infra PART
III.G.3.
106
See infra PART III.G. This category of potential defendants, including state
factories and state-owned corporations, is the most problematic under U.S. law. This
by no means suggests that the U.S. government or other foreign sovereigns have not
been involved, but their inclusion as defendants would immediately raise defense
issues which in turn would dramatically alter the character of the potential litigation.
Although other authors—most notably Professor Kenneth R. Rutherford—have
presented some forceful legal and moral arguments that the United States and other
sovereigns should bear the costs for compensating landmine victims, these
arguments are grounded primarily on international law and are not the focus of this
Article. Under U.S. law, in addition to the likely defense issues, a more in depth
discussion than is possible in this Article should include a thorough review of the
104
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Finally, a plaintiff could sue both the producers and the
107
governments with whom they contracted.
2. Foreign Corporations
A special problem arises when considering foreign corporations.
Because U.S. courts may have a difficult time exerting jurisdiction
over such corporations, a foreign corporation conducting business
solely in another country will not meet the minimum contacts
requirement for jurisdiction in the United States. The Alien Tort
Claims Act, however, grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign
defendants in tort actions where plaintiffs assert a tort claim that
108
violates a U.S. treaty or the “law of nations.” This injects the need
to argue that the use of landmines violates international law, an
argument that has been well made previously, but it is not the focus
109
of this Article.
Alien Tort Statute of 1789, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the act of
state doctrine, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, and possibly the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 for their potential impact on jurisdiction.
107
It is interesting to note that even if a class sues a particular producer or group
of component part-makers and is able to overcome the personal jurisdiction
problems, the named defendants may move to join the United States or another
government with whom the producer contracted. In this case, a new set of problems
arises with regard to joinder and intervention.
108
U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction over actions arising from a tort committed
against an alien in violation of the “law of nations.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). The
“law of nations” has been interpreted to mean generally law dealing with the
relationship among nations rather than individuals. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d
24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976). Some courts have held that the statute can be invoked to
confer federal subject matter jurisdiction in a private claim because all that is
required is a violation of the “law of nations.” Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847
(11th Cir. 1976). Other courts, however, have held explicitly that the Act is only
applicable between nations. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07
(D.C. Cir. 1985). One obstacle facing the use of the Act in litigation against
landmine producers may be that some courts interpret the Act to apply to individuals
only, not corporations. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
La. 1997). There may be, however, other precedent to contradict this notion—
Beanal is a district court decision and therefore not binding on other district courts.
Moreover, this decision may be attacked on several grounds, including the notion
that federal subject matter jurisdiction and federal diversity jurisdiction generally
apply to corporations as well as individuals. See Rivera Sanchez v. MARS, Inc., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 187 (D.P.R. 1998). The alien’s tort action may also provide subject matter
jurisdiction over certain kinds of groups or organizations. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996).
109
See, e.g., R.J. Araujo, Anti-Personnel Mines and Peremptory Norms of International
Law: Argument and Catalyst, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1997) (analyzing the
problems of anti-personnel mines under international law). See also Mary A. Ferrer,
Affirming Our Common Humanity: Regulating Landmines to Protect Civilians and Children
in the Developing World, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 135 (1996) (discussing the
shortcomings of international law’s regulation of landmine use); Janet E. Lord, Legal
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D. Federal v. State Court Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
To bring a claim in federal court, the court must not only have
personal jurisdiction, as discussed above, but also jurisdiction over
the subject matter at issue. A court has subject-matter jurisdiction
where a question arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, or where there is diversity of citizenship among the
110
parties.
For federal question jurisdiction to be present, the
111
“plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action” must show that it
was created by federal law, or “if the plaintiff’s cause of action is
based on state law, a federal law that creates a cause of action is an
112
essential component of the plaintiff’s claim.”
This “well-pleaded
complaint rule” does not allow the plaintiff to anticipate a federal
defense to his claim nor does it allow a defendant to remove a case to
113
federal court based on a federal defense.
In the potential landmine cases involved here, there is no
“arising under” jurisdiction because there is no federal law at issue in
the plaintiffs’ claims. It is likely, though, that there will be diversity of
citizenship. Diversity, however, must be complete—no one plaintiff
114
can be from the same state as any one defendant.
Therefore, in
these cases, it must be made certain that if numerous defendants are
115
named, they cannot be from the same states as the plaintiffs. In the
case of class actions, the rules change because only the named
116
plaintiffs need be diverse to all the defendants.
This should not
present a problem in the types of cases under consideration here.
If a landmine victim decides to sue a foreign government, the
federal courts will have jurisdiction under The Foreign Sovereign
117
Under the FSIA, federal district courts
Immunities Act (FSIA).
have jurisdiction over “a foreign state . . . as to any claim . . . with
Restraints on the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Environmental Crisis, 25 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 311 (1995) (discussing the problems landmines present under
international law).
110
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
111
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
112
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 274 (1999).
113
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
114
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
115
A plaintiff’s “state” is determined by his place of domicile, which is defined as
the place where he has his “true, fixed, and permanent home and principal
establishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent
therefrom.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at 294 (citation omitted).
116
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); see also Mehlenbacher v. Akzo
Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000).
117
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976).
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respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . .”
Regardless of the application of the FSIA, there still would be
diversity jurisdiction between a landmine victim (a foreign national)
and an alien defendant, including a foreign government.
E. Choice of Law

When a case is litigated in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction, or where state claims are brought along with federal
claims, the court must determine what state’s law applies to the
controversy. Each state has choice of law rules that it applies to a
particular cause of action to determine what law applies. As a general
rule, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law
119
rules of the state in which it sits.
When a case is complex and
involves many claimants from many different states, however, the
choice of law rules become difficult to apply. For instance, in tort
cases, a state’s choice of law rules usually look to apply the law of the
120
place where the tort occurred.
When the tort occurs in a foreign
nation, however, a question arises as to whether the federal court
must apply the law of that foreign nation.
121
In Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, the plaintiff sued for a
death and injury “resulting from the premature explosion of a 105122
mm howitzer round in Cambodia.” The district court and court of
123
appeals held that Texas strict liability law applied to the occurrence.
This decision, however, ignored Texas’ choice of law rule, which
mandated that the law of the place where the tort occurred should
124
govern.
Recognizing this conflict, the Supreme Court overruled
the court of appeals and held that Texas should have applied its
125
choice of law rule, resulting in the application of Cambodian tort
126
law.
If landmine litigation is sustained in a federal court, it can be
argued that instead of applying the substantive law of a particular

118

28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
120
Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
121
423 U.S. 3 (1975).
122
Id. at 3.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 4-5 (holding that, in diversity suits, a federal court is to apply the
forum state’s choice of law rule regardless of whether it points to the forum’s
substantive law).
125
Id.
126
Id.
119
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127

state, federal common law should be applied. In the “Agent Orange”
products liability litigation, the Eastern District of New York applied
“federal or national consensus common law to all substantive issues”
128
at bar.
In reaching this decision, Judge Weinstein surveyed five
approaches to conflicts law. These approaches, as will be discussed
more fully below, included those based on: (1) the Restatement
(First) approach; (2) the Restatement (Second) approach; (3) the
129
governmental interest approach; (4) Professor Leflar’s analysis; and
130
(5) the forum approach.
The First Restatement on Conflicts of Laws suggests applying the
131
law of the place where the wrong occurred.
This approach, taken
132
by Texas’ choice of law rule, was ultimately applied in Challoner.
Cambodian law applied in that case because that is where the wrong
occurred. In “Agent Orange”, however, the court did not apply this
approach because no party argued for the application of Vietnamese,
133
Cambodian, or Laotian law.
More importantly, the court stated
that it would be “ludicrous” for the United States to apply the law of a
134
place with which it had been, until recently, at war.
Similar logic could be applied in landmine cases. The injuries
have occurred all over the world including places entangled in civil
war. It is improbable and perhaps “ludicrous” to apply the law of a
land with an unstable or transitional government and weak or
changing rules of law. Under the First Restatement, then, federal
courts should not apply the law of a foreign nation. Likewise, no
particular U.S. state has more concern than another in the outcome
of the litigation. Therefore, a national consensus law should apply
rather than state substantive law.
The Second Restatement approach mandates that a court follow
135
the statutory directive of the state in which it sits.
When no
directive is applicable, the court shall consider a number of factors to
127

The substance of federal common law can be determined by looking at “state
law sources, the Restatement of Law of the American Law Institute, and other ‘nonfederal’ sources.” See In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
128
See id. at 711.
129
Id. at 706 (describing the Leflar approach as taking into consideration “five
choice-influencing considerations” in light of specific facts) (citation omitted). See
generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267, 269 (1966).
130
See In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708.
131
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1971).
132
423 U.S. at 4-5.
133
In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708.
134
See id. at 707.
135
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6(1) (1971).
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determine what law applies. These include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the
relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of
justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
136
law to be applied.

In a tort case specifically, the court must consider which state
had the “most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
137
parties.”
This will include an examination of where the tort
occurred, where the conduct that caused the injuries occurred, the
“domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties,” and where the relationship of the parties is
138
The court concluded, in “Agent Orange”, that where
centered.
injuries occurred in all fifty states and other countries, where the
products in question could not be identified as coming from any one
defendant, and where “neither the plaintiff nor the defendant . . .
[had] any significant contact with the [forum] state other than the
fact that suit was filed in that state,” a particular state’s interests would
139
not be considered in determining choice of law. In landmine cases,
the only contact with the states in which suits would be filed, if any,
would be the defendants’ places of incorporation, business, or
residence. Therefore, no state’s interest should be considered
relevant.
The governmental interest conflicts approach requires that the
court “consider whether the public policy of a particular legislature
would be furthered, frustrated or is irrelevant if applied in the case at
140
bar.” The court held in “Agent Orange” that no one state would be
affected; rather, the national legislature would be affected. It would,
therefore, be more appropriate to apply federal law. The same
rationale could be applied to landmine litigation. Because the
injuries did not take place in any U.S. state, the concern is a national
rather than a local one.
Under the Leflar approach, a court will consider the
“predictability of legal result, maintenance of interstate order,

136
137
138
139
140

Id. at § 6(2).
Id. at § 145.
Id.
In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 701.
Id. at 706.
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simplification of the judicial task, the forum’s governmental interests,
141
and a preference for application of the better law.”
Judge
Weinstein found this last factor important, stating that federal law was
more progressive and provided a better law. It is possible that in the
landmine litigation setting, a federal products liability law like that
applied in “Agent Orange” would provide a more just result.
The final approach considered by Judge Weinstein was the
forum approach. This approach applies when foreign law would
142
normally govern, but neither party pleads such an application.
When this occurs, the court will apply the law of the forum in which it
143
sits or dismiss the case.
This rule simply reinforces the idea that
national law is preferred to foreign law in cases tried in U.S. federal
courts. When the law of the forum state has not contemplated
litigation similar to that before it, federal law will apply because the
144
state lacks the resources to handle such litigation. It is likely that no
state is prepared to deal with the magnitude of landmine litigation.
Therefore, as with the other approaches, it would seem more
appropriate to apply federal common law.
Finally, there is a significant distinction to consider between
“Agent Orange” and potential landmine litigation. The plaintiffs in
“Agent Orange” were members of the U.S. armed services and their
145
families.
Judge Weinstein’s opinion is rife with references to the
146
Likewise, Judge Weinstein
distinct federal character of soldiers.
repeatedly mentions Congressional legislation passed to protect
147
“Agent Orange” victims.
This federal involvement cannot be found
in the case of landmines. The victims are civilians and no federal
legislation has been passed to provide them with compensation for
their injuries.
Federal involvement, however, still abounds.
Landmine victims’ injuries would not have occurred had the United
States not been involved in the making of landmines for warring
nations. It could be appropriate, therefore, for a court to apply a
federal or national consensus law when considering choice of law in
landmine litigation.
141

Id. at 707; see also Leflar, supra note 129, at 282-304.
In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708.
143
Id.
144
See id. at 709 (“[I]t has been clearly shown in this litigation why the law of the
forum should be displaced in the face of the overwhelmingly national and federal
aspects of the case. A state court in such a position, having no preexisting applicable
conflicts rule, would turn to federal or national consensus law.”).
145
Id. at 693.
146
Id. at 704.
147
See id. at 698, 704.
142
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F. Bases for Liability
Landmine producers and their component suppliers made
business decisions to enter the competitive landmine market where
they designed, manufactured, and marketed their products in the
hopes of generating financial profits. By viewing landmines as a
product manufactured for profit, the relevant U.S. substantive laws
regarding potential liability for landmine related injuries are
148
relatively straightforward.
1. Products Liability
The idea of liability is “founded on the opinion . . . that the
defendant ought to have acted otherwise, or, in other words, that he
149
was to blame.” Products liability can be based on either negligence
or strict liability. Negligence places blame on a defendant for failing
to act with ordinary care, whereas strict liability focuses on the
150
plaintiff’s injuries rather than the defendant’s behavior.
Products liability evolved both as a means to compensate injured
plaintiffs and to provide a powerful incentive to producers,
distributors, and sellers to provide fundamentally safe products.
Knowing that financial damages could result from making,
distributing, or selling a faulty product, gives producers an economic,
if not, a moral incentive to protect consumers.
a. Negligence
Negligence is an age-old concept that can be defined as
“conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
151
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” One acts
within the appropriate standard when he acts with ordinary care, or
as a “reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the
152
circumstance . . . .” If a person fails to act with ordinary prudence
and causes injury to another, then that person will be held liable for
148

This is not to minimize the complications discussed separately in this Article
arising from the involvement of governments (in terms of immunity and related
defenses), the enormity and complexity of the factual aspects, and the political and
emotional issues.
149
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1971) (1881).
150
See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983) (Politz, C.J.,
dissenting) (“A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically the quality of the
act causing the injury; a strict products liability action focuses on the product itself.”).
151
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
152
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 209
(5th ed. 1984).
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the resulting damages.
Producers of products, like any other defendant, sometimes act
outside the realm of ordinary care. This breach of duty of care may
manifest itself in a product defect or in a failure to produce safer
designs, which may then result in injury to the products’ users.
Further, that duty of care extends to innocent bystanders, thereby,
153
extending the scope of the producers’ liability.
Regardless of their intended use, landmines are products just
like automobiles, power tools, or blasting caps. Landmine producers
breached their duty of care by failing to design and produce
landmines with available safety features, such as a self-destruct or selfdeactivating mechanism, which, if included, would have reduced the
risk of injury to innocent bystanders. Therefore, under a traditional
negligence products liability theory, landmine producers should be
held liable for injuries resulting from the use of their products.
A key question that often arises in negligence products liability
cases is whether a “defendant may exonerate itself by showing that it
154
adopted and lived up to the standard existing in the industry.” In
other words, if the entire automobile industry uses a faulty door latch
system when safer designs would have prevented injuries, can
individual producers be relieved of liability? Judge Learned Hand
answered this question in T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp.:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.
It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse
155
their omission.

Even before the United States entered the Vietnam War, it was
156
possible to create a landmine with a self-destructing mechanism.
Most mines, however, were not made with these mechanisms because
doing so would have added cost and reduced the attractiveness of the
landmines in the marketplace. The entire industry’s failure to
employ self-destruct mechanisms will not excuse the decision of
individual companies and government agencies not to forge ahead
for the protection of innocent civilians. Under this theory, the
importance of a self-destruct mechanism toward reducing the risks
153
154
155
156

See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW 175 (1990).
T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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for innocent civilian bystanders is so “imperative that even its
157
universal disregard [does not] excuse its omission.”
In the alternative, if a court will not accept the failure to employ
a self-destruct mechanism as a per se breach of duty, another theory
could be advanced. This approach would define landmines as
defective. Because landmines are doing what they were designed to
158
do when they maim or dismember victims, it becomes more
difficult to find a defect as defined by traditional products liability
theory. The failure to use a reasonable alternative that would have
made a product safer has been held to constitute defective design
159
and, thus, a breach of duty.
Landmines, therefore, might be
considered defectively designed products because there was a safer
and more reasonable alternative available to landmine producers.
After the plaintiffs establish a breach of a legally recognized duty
by the landmine producers, they must then show that the breach
caused their injuries. There are two types of causation: causation in
160
fact and proximate causation. Causation in fact can be established
by looking at the facts in question and applying either the “but for”
or the substantial factor test. If the plaintiffs’ injuries would not have
occurred “but for” the defendants’ wrongful conduct, there is
causation. The substantial factor test requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant’s behavior was a substantial factor in bringing
161
about his injury, and must also be a material element of the injury.
Proximate causation is more difficult because it “involves a policy
determination made by the court that requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that a defendant’s actions occurred through a linear

157

60 F.2d at 740.
“The mine has been designed with a view to disable personnel. Operating
research has shown that it is better to disable a man than to kill him.” EXPOSING THE
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting Technical Specifications for Mine Anti-Personnel
(P4MK2), PAKISTAN ORDINANCE FACTORIES BROCHURE); see also Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
(Amended Protocol II), amended May 3, 1996, 2 U.S.T. 105-1, at 37 (defining antipersonnel landmines as “mine[s] primarily designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more
persons”).
159
Townsend v. Gen. Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994); Timothy D.
Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining A
Suitable Role for the Tort Systems in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 13
(2000) (discussing guns as a defective product).
160
See Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact:
Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L.
REV. 311, 311-14 (1990).
161
KEETON ET AL., supra note 152, § 41, at 267-68.
158
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chain of events and were not broken by an intervening third party.”
163
A plaintiff must also prove both general and specific causation.
General causation means that the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s product was capable of causing his injury; whereas
specific causation requires a showing that the defendant’s product
164
did cause his injury.
While general causation could be proven,
specific causation may create potential problems for landmine victims
if not dealt with properly. In many cases, plaintiffs may not know the
producer of the mine that injured them. Presumably, if the
particular producer cannot be identified because mines explode into
numerous pieces, it may be difficult to prove that one producer
caused a victim’s injury.
There are two solutions to this problem. First, plaintiffs could
argue that, just as in the “Agent Orange” case, general causation
suffices. In “Agent Orange”, Judge Weinstein allowed the plaintiffs to
recover even though they could not prove which defendants’
chemicals caused their injuries, only that each defendant’s product
165
could have.
This inability to prove specific causation was then
taken into account when compensation was determined. Therefore,
everyone who was injured recovered damages, but less than they
166
would have had they been able to prove specific causation.
Plaintiffs who could not even prove general causation, though, could
not recover under “Agent Orange”. Unless a plaintiff could prove his
injury was “of the kind caused by defendant’s conduct” and that he
167
was “placed at risk by the defendant’s acts,” he could not recover.
Landmine cases are very similar to the “Agent Orange” cases.
After a mine explodes, there is no way to determine the producer.
Therefore, if proving specific causation is a requirement, few
plaintiffs could ever recover. It is necessary to adopt the logic of
Judge Weinstein in “Agent Orange” regarding specific causation if
justice is to be done.

162

James Pizzirusso, Note, Increased Risk, Fear of Disease and Medical Monitoring: Are
Novel Damage Claims Enough to Overcome Causation Difficulties in Toxic Torts?, 7 ENVTL.
LAW. 183, 184 (2000).
163
Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996).
164
See Wheat v. Sofamor, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
165
597 F. Supp. at 782, 827 (drawing a parallel to alternative liability in the
asbestos realm, stating “the plaintiff does not determinatively prove which producer’s
asbestos caused his injury. A prima facie case is shown if the plaintiff can prove that
he was exposed to the defendant’s products on at least one occasion.”).
166
Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 893 (1982).
167
Id.
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The second solution to the specific causation problem is for the
plaintiffs to assert an enterprise liability theory. This theory was first
asserted and accepted in Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. in
168
1972. In that case, thirteen children sued the producers of blasting
169
caps.
These incidents occurred in twelve distinct situations in ten
170
different states. The plaintiffs did not know which company made
171
which blasting caps, so they sued every blasting cap producer. The
court allowed the plaintiffs to name all producers as defendants
172
because they comprised the entire blasting cap industry. Likewise,
the court there found the defendants to have “adhered to an
industry-wide standard with regard to safety features of blasting caps .
173
. . .”
Enterprise liability was again asserted in Sindell v. Abbott
174
Laboratories.
In that case, “[t]he plaintiff, a cancer victim whose
175
mother ha[d] ingested DES when pregnant with her,” named
numerous pharmaceutical companies as defendants, claiming they
collaborated in the “production, marketing, promotion and testing of
176
DES,” and were thus responsible for her injuries.
The plaintiff
argued that instead of the burden being on her to prove that a
particular producer’s product caused her injuries, the burden should
be placed on the defendants to prove they were not the producer
whose product injured her. When most of the producers were
unable to show they were not the ones who injured the plaintiff, the
court apportioned liability in proportion to that company’s share of
177
the DES market.
Likewise, the plaintiffs in landmine litigation
could name all known landmine producers and then assert that if
168

345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 359.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 358.
172
The individual trials in this case resulted in judgments for the defendants on
other grounds. See Lehtonen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
633 (D. Mont. 1975); see also Davis v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Ball v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 519 F.2d
715 (6th Cir. 1975).
173
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934.
174
Id. The enterprise liability theory is asserted very often in large products
liability cases. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass’n Inc., 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.
1993) (applying theory used in case against multiple lead pigment manufacturers);
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing enterprise
liability theory). See also Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
175
Delgado, supra note 166, at 882.
176
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934.
177
See Delgado, supra note 166, at 882.
169
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none can prove that they were not the maker of the particular
landmines in question, they must be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries
in proportion to their share of the landmine market.
A final causation problem is that of superseding or intervening
causes. A plaintiff’s case may be thwarted if a defendant can show
that a superseding or intervening event actually caused the plaintiff’s
178
injuries. In the case of landmines, defendants could argue that any
number of events might have occurred between the time of the
manufacturing and shipping of the landmines and the time of the
explosion. For instance, it is possible that third parties buried the
179
mines incorrectly, altered the mines, or acted criminally in order to
cause the types of injuries at issue. Of course, they might also argue
that landmines should have been retrieved or destroyed by the
original users after their intended use, and that such failure
constituted a misuse of the product.
Although landmine producers might make these arguments,
they are not likely to prevail because, when the mines were made, the
companies knew the potential risks for tampering and misuse—the
occurrence of foreseeable intervening acts cannot exonerate the
producers from liability. The producers were aware of the possible
shipment to terrorists or to third parties not trained in mine
technology. Because of this, the producers should not be relieved of
liability simply because the expected occurred.
b. Strict Liability
Strict liability, unlike negligence, does not look to place blame
on the defendant. Rather, it focuses on the plaintiff’s injuries and
places the cost of that injury on the person more able to absorb the
loss. Strict liability is divided into two separate concepts: product
180
defects and abnormally dangerous products.
Defective product strict liability is based on the idea that a
producer of a defective product is “in the best position to either

178

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440-441 (defining superceding and
intervening causes); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 152 § 44, at 312 (asserting that
defendant is not liable for injuries caused by superceding or intervening causes that
are not foreseeable).
179
Third party criminal acts, which qualify as intervening or superseding in the
explosives field, include “the acts of distributors who fail to prevent criminal theft of
explosives, retailers who sell explosives to criminals, or terrorists who intentionally
misuse explosives to inflict harm upon others . . . .” Alan Calnan & Andrew W.
Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological & Regulatory
Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177, 253 (1999).
180
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
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insure against the loss or spread the loss among all the consumers of
181
the product.” The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, . .
. if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it
182
is sold.

This rule applies even if the seller has acted with reasonable care and
183
has no contractual relationship with the user or consumer.
The rules governing strict liability are based on years of case law
that have established public policy interests as the rationale for
attachment of such liability. All of these interests are directly
applicable to the case of landmines, including: the substantial cost of
injury to a victim as compared with the ability to insure the risk of
184
injury by the seller; the public interest in discouraging producers
185
from marketing defective products;
the inability to prove
negligence because of the secretive nature of manufacturing
186
processes; and the inability of a plaintiff to investigate thoroughly
187
the safety of a particular product.
The production and use of landmines could also be defined as
abnormally dangerous activities. “Abnormally dangerous activity” is
defined as including six factors: (1) the “existence of a high degree of
risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;” (2) the
“likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;” (3) the
“inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;” (4)
the “extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;”
(5) the “inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on;” and (6) the “extent to which its value to the community
188
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.”
The production of
181

Ogle v. Catepillar Tractor, 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986) (citing William L.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability on the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1120 (1960).
182
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(1) (1965).
183
Id. at § 402(A)(2).
184
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63 (Cali. 1962).
185
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cali. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); see also Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829,
843 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 963 (W.D. Mo.
1993).
186
Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
187
Id.
188
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979).
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landmines meets every condition under this definition. It is almost
certain that a person, land or chattel will be injured. The harm that
occurs when a landmine explodes often includes dismemberment or
death. Landmine producers could not completely eliminate the risk
by using reasonable care because even the installation of self-destruct
mechanisms would not eliminate all risk. Landmines, despite the
tens of millions sold, are not a matter of common usage. The
presence of sixty to seventy million landmines in post-conflict areas is
anything but appropriate to the place. Finally, landmines arguably
provide absolutely no value to any community that could be weighed
against their dangerous attributes.
If landmine production is held to be an abnormally dangerous
activity, then the producers will be liable “for all injury resulting from
the activity . . . regardless of who was at fault. The injury must, of
course, be one of the kinds of harm which one expects given the
190
dangerous nature of the activity.”
The kinds of harm which
landmines have caused for decades have been precisely what every
landmine producer could have expected.
The producers of
landmines have created an enormous risk of civilian injury or death,
and they have profited from creating such risk. Therefore, under
strict liability, the burden of the loss should be placed on the
producers.
A potential problem with strict liability is that many
manufacturers produce only components of landmines. Therefore, a
question of fairness arises. Should a component part maker be held
strictly liable even though its particular part may not have been
defective or its particular contribution may not be abnormally
dangerous? The Consumer Protection Act provides guidance in
191
answering this question. It mandates that component part makers
will be liable unless “they can show the defect was a result of
instructions given by the manufacturer of the final product or was

189

Another interesting attempt to utilize this analysis is being applied in gun
manufacturer litigation. These cases seek to determine whether gun manufacturers
should be held strictly liable for injuries or deaths caused by their productsnamely
handguns. See, e.g.; Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Copier
By & Through Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). See
generally Joi Gardner Pearson, Comment, Make It, Market It, and You May Have to Pay
For It: An Evaluation of Gun Manufacturer Liability for the Criminal Use of Uniquely
Dangerous Firearms in Light of In Re 101 California Street, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 131
(1997).
190
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635, 639
(N.D. Ill. 1987).
191
Consumer Protection Act, 1987, Ch. 45 § 1 (Eng).
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due to negligence on the part of the final product manufacturer.”
Taking a different approach, section five of the Restatement Third of
Torts states that a component part seller is liable for the harm caused
by its component part if (1) the product (the component part) is
defective, or (2) the seller substantially participates in the integration
193
of the component part into the end product. If the first prong of
the Restatement is met, “the plaintiff must [also] show that the
product defect caused the harm,” whereas if the second prong is met,
“the plaintiff must also show that the integration of the component
194
part caused the [end] product to be defective.”
These two sources provide a guide for what a court might do
195
regarding landmine component part makers.
If landmine victims
could show that the producers knew the product they were
manufacturing would become part of a landmine, liability could
apply and, following the Consumer Protection Act, the component
part makers could be liable.
The analysis is a bit more involved under the Restatement.
Under the Restatement, a landmine victim would have to show either
that the product was defective and that defect caused him harm, or
the particular component part maker substantially participated in the
integration of its part with the whole and that the part caused the
whole to be defective. In the end, a court would have to consider the
special use of landmines and the knowledge of the makers in
determining whether strict liability should apply.
2. Negligent Entrustment
Another possible cause of action against landmine producers is
negligent entrustment. One may be held liable for this tort if he
”permit[s] a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity”
that is under his control and where he “knows or should know that
such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself
in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of
196
harm to others.” A claim of negligent entrustment will be upheld if
192

Susan H. Easton, The Path for Japan?: An Examination of Product Liability Laws in
the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311,
319-20 (2000).
193
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (1998).
194
Carly E. Beauvais, Products Liability: Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d
712 (R.I. 1999), 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2000).
195
Several courts have followed these approaches in the past. See, e.g., Moor v.
Iowa Mfg. Co., 320 N.W.2d 927 (S.D. 1982); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., Inc.,
733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999).
196
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 308 (1965).
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the plaintiff can prove that the product is highly dangerous, the seller
had “specific knowledge of the buyer’s dangerous intent or is witness
to conduct that clearly evinces his unsuitability to use the product,
and, given the available information, the seller displays a reckless
disregard for the safety of the buyer or others whom she may
197
injure.” This tort has been used in cases where plaintiffs claim gun
producers have negligently entrusted guns to buyers who have then
criminally or tortuously injured the plaintiffs. Only one of these suits,
198
however, has been successful, while all others have been summarily
199
dismissed.
In the case of landmines, producers create a dangerous
instrumentality and then sell it overseas to warring countries or
factions within countries. Though landmine producers most often
negotiate with governments, these same producers know or should
know that landmines will end up in the hands of people not qualified
to handle them properly. These producers also know that some of
the landmines they entrust to buyers subsequently will be sold to
terrorists and criminals. This conduct is in reckless disregard for the
safety of many civilians who, as a result, will undoubtedly be maimed
or killed by landmines.
3. Intentional Torts
The key to committing an intentional tort is, of course, intent.
Without it, there can be no finding of liability. Advancing an
intentional tort theory in the case of landmines is more difficult than
the other options discussed above. This is primarily because the
intent element is difficult to satisfy. Battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress arguably could have applications for landmine
victims. Public nuisance and trespass would, at best, be difficult
claims for victims defined in this Article, although these claims might
be effective for property owners in areas affected by landmines.
Battery is the intentional harmful or offensive touching of

197

See Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 156, at 268.
See Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (holding that “it is
entirely consistent with public policy to hold the manufacturers and marketers of
Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent persons who suffer
gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products,” and that such liability is
“warranted”).
199
See Court Dismisses Negligent Entrustment Claim in Chicago Suit Against Gun Makers,
28 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 142 (Feb. 21, 2000); see also Copier By &
Through Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998); City of
Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 902-04 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Penelas v.
Arms Techn., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
198
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200

another. In the case of landmines, a plaintiff could assert that the
producers intended harmful or offensive touching to occur when
their landmines exploded, but because the intent of the producers is
to harm combatants, a plaintiff must assert transferred intent.
Transferred intent means that “if A aims at B, and hits C, C can sue A
for battery, even though he was not the intended victim and even
201
though battery is an intentional tort.” Battery is a plausible cause of
action where victim (C) is a civilian, as would be the case for all
plaintiffs here, even though producer (A) was aiming for combatants
(B). The difficulty here is not the transfer of intent, but rather the
intent itself. Plaintiffs would need to show that landmine producers
(A) intended to harm combatants (B).
A person may be liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress if he “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
202
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another . . . .”
A
landmine victim may be able to sustain such a cause of action if he
can show that the production of landmines is extreme or outrageous
conduct. This may be difficult because landmines are considered a
viable weapon in combat situations. Considering the extremely
hazardous and indiscriminate character of landmines, however, it is
possible that their production may be determined extreme. The fact
that the purpose of landmines is to maim and mutilate substantially
203
helps the victim’s case.
It is also possible that those who witnessed the explosion, which
dismembered or killed a family member, could file a claim. In order
to bring such a claim, the plaintiff would have to show that he is
“closely related to the injury victim,” was “present at the scene of the
injury-producing event at the time it [occurred] and [was] aware that
it [caused] injury to the victim and . . . as a result [suffered]
emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated by a
204
disinterested witness.”
It is probable that family members
witnessing the injury of a landmine victim could prove such a case,
although the issue of intent remains problematic.
Public nuisance is the “unreasonable interference with a right
205
common to the general public.” To determine if an “unreasonable

200

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1992).
202
Russell v. Salve Regina College, 649 F. Supp. 391, 400 (D.R.I. 1986) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
203
See EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5.
204
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
205
Lytton, supra note 159, at 45-46.
201
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interference” has occurred, there must be a factual determination
about how the conduct in question “(1) is proscribed by statute; (2)
involves a significant interference with public health, safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience; or (3) is of a continuing nature and has
produced long-lasting and significant effects on a public right, of
206
which the defendant knows or has reason to know.” The state or a
private citizen can bring a public nuisance claim. Lighting fireworks,
storing explosives, and emitting loud and disturbing noises have all
207
been held to be public nuisances.
Landmines certainly are more
disturbing than these examples, yet it would be difficult to reach the
landmine producers under this claim since they likely are too far
removed from the actual nuisance activity.
Trespass to land is an invasion “(a) which interferes with the
right of exclusive possession of the land, and (b) which is a direct
208
result of some act committed by the defendant.” The insertion of
explosives into private land by buyers of landmines would be an
invasion of an owner’s possessory interest in the land. Whether the
producers of landmines could be held liable for this invasion,
however, is questionable.
Though the producers know their
landmines will be planted, this typically occurs during armed conflicts
and the producers’ relationship to those who physically plant the
mines is very attenuated. Further, as with public nuisance, only those
who own property under which mines have been planted would have
standing to sue.
In sum, none of the possible intentional torts offer viable causes
of action for plaintiff landmine victims as defined in this Article.
G. Defenses
Assuming any action in a landmine case would follow products
liability or strict liability theories, the possible defenses are relatively
straightforward. The more unusual and stronger defenses arise
primarily from the character of landmines as weapons and the
involvement of either the U.S. government or foreign governments in
the contracting or licensing of exports.

206

Id.
See generally Landau v. City of New York, 72 N.E. 631 (N.Y. 1904); State v.
Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 169 S.W. 267 (Mo. 1914); Town of Preble v. Song
Mountain, Inc., 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
208
See Joshua M. Penrod, Note, Refusing to Torture the Ancient Doctrine of Trespass:
Kernan v. Homestead Development Co., 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 67, 6869 (2000).
207
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1. Statutes of Limitations and Equitable Tolling
A threshold issue for a landmine suit, as with any civil litigation,
is whether or not the suit is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. This issue is complicated in the case of landmines
because of the multiple jurisdictions in which the injuries occurred
and because there is no set jurisdiction for bringing suits against
landmine producers. To determine the proper statute of limitations,
209
courts follow three steps:
first, they “look to the federal law for
guidance;” second, in the absence of a federal proscription, they
“look to state common law;” and third, if state common law is
inconsistent with the intent of the federal law, they do not apply state
210
law.
As the first step in the analysis, one of the few federal statutes
helpful to foreign victims of landmines is the Alien Tort Claims Act
211
(the ATCA). The ATCA applies “where . . . an alien sues . . . for a
212
tort . . . which was committed in violation of the law of nations.”
Any foreign national meeting all three requirements may bring suit
in the U.S. federal courts. This is key for landmine victims who may
not have access to a judicial forum in their home country, or for
those who live in a country with no laws allowing such a claim. The
matter, however, becomes complicated by the ATCA’s silence on the
213
issue of timing. The ATCA has no statute of limitations.
In fact,
while some federal statutes regarding human rights or genocide, such
214
as the Torture Victims Act, provide definite time limits, most leave
215
that issue open.
Since there is no federal time limit on suits brought under the
ATCA or other federal statutes that might provide guidance, federal
courts next look to apply the limitations period of the “most closely
216
analogous statute of limitations under state law.”
Looking at case
law, the courts have held that “a federal district court sitting in
217
diversity must apply the choice of law precepts of the forum state.”
209

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000).
Justin H. Roy, Strengthening Human Rights Protection: Why the Holocaust Slave
Labor Claims Should Be Litigated, 1 SCHOLAR 153, n.381 (1999).
211
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
212
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 2000 WL 1411100, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000).
213
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 462 (1999).
214
28 U.S.C. section 1350 bars claims that are over 10 years old. Roy, supra note
210, at n.375.
215
For example, in 28 U.S.C. section 1331, “there is no prided statute of
limitations.” Roy, supra note 210, at 199.
216
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
217
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
210
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To determine what state law is most applicable, courts must look to
the state law most closely analogous. If the injury sustained by the
plaintiff has a counterpart in a state statute, that law’s statute of
limitations will be used.
Plaintiffs in a landmine injury case would assert tort claims,
which, in most states, involve a relatively short statute of limitations,
218
typically two to three years from the time of injury.
Nevertheless,
equitable estoppel principles can bar defendants from raising the
statute of limitations defense under certain circumstances in which
there was fraud, concealment, deception, or other misconduct by the
219
Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations for
defendant.
landmine victims could depend both on the choice of forum and of
the particular causes of action.
State law still might not provide the appropriate statute of
limitations. In cases where the state law is in conflict with the spirit of
a federal act or statute, “a narrow exception to this rule [exists] when
another federal statute or rule ‘clearly provides a closer analogy than
available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make the [federal statute] a significantly
220
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.’”
Finally, and most importantly, equitable tolling principles offer
another avenue for tolling the statute of limitations in a landmine
case. The facts of landmine cases are unique and suitable for the
application of equitable tolling principles. Most of the world’s
landmines are located in developing countries with numerous legal
systems or, in some cases, little or no rule of law. Landmine victims
often live in poverty with very limited healthcare services, legal
assistance, or even current news available to them. Further, some of
the mines were placed in their current locations decades ago. The

218

In Illinois, for example, there is a ten-year statute of limitations for an action
for breach of a written contract; a five-year statute of limitations “for breach of an
oral contract, or for other civil actions without an express time period;” a five-year
catch-all statute; and a two-year statute for personal injury claims. Sampson v. Fed.
Rep. of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
219
For example, under the New York equitable estoppel principle, “[a] party may
be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense where his fraud,
concealment, or deception prevented the plaintiff from timely filing his claim.” Roy,
supra note 210, at 201. Pennsylvania common law also recognizes equitable tolling in
certain causes of action: “common law negligent misrepresentation in the business
context . . . does recognize equitable tolling in such circumstances.” In re Chambers
Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602, 627 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
220
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488
U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (quoting DelCostello v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172
(1983))).
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victims themselves may not be aware of the avenues available to them
to obtain relief because many reside in desolate areas of the world.
They cannot afford representation and often are unaware of the
possibility of bringing a suit at all. Still other nations of origin may
not have the proper laws in place to bring a suit against landmine
producers and may not be aware of U.S. laws until most statute of
limitation periods have already run out. On the whole, preparation
of any suit or even determining which producers are the proper
defendants for a particular suit likely would require a great deal of
time. To alleviate the injustice to those victims, there are ways for
tolling the statute of limitations.
Two circumstances in which equitable tolling can stop the
statute of limitations are: 1) “where the defendant has actively misled
221
the plaintiff”; or 2) where a defendant has concealed “facts that
222
This is
would alert the plaintiff to the plaintiff’s claim.”
problematic for landmine victims because they would need to prove
that a failure by defendant producers to notify buyers of a safer
alternative was misleading or constituted concealment. Further, such
failure to notify the landmine buyers should be extended to the
plaintiffs who ultimately suffered injuries as a result. Even so,
[e]quitable tolling applies in the “usual case” where an injured
party remains ignorant of fraudulent conduct without any want of
diligence or due care on his or her part. In such case, the bar of
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is
discovered, even where [a] defendant has not taken special efforts
223
to conceal the fraud.

In such cases of concealment, the key is to look to the date when
224
items were made public.
It could be argued that landmine victims, often situated in
locations where access to current information is very limited, have yet
to learn that their injuries might have been prevented. Failing to
show concealment, plaintiff landmine victims might argue that the
doctrine of unclean hands allows for equitable tolling if they could
show that the defendants conspired or otherwise actively withheld
225
information from the plaintiffs regarding safer alternatives.
The
weakness of these arguments, in addition to the obvious burden of

221

Id. at 467.
Bodner, 2000 WL 1411100, at *15.
223
Quote contained in a Westlaw headnote preceding In re Chambers Dev. Sec.
Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
224
Roy, supra note 210, at 201.
225
Id.
222
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proof problems, is that any alleged concealment of facts by the
defendants was from the landmine buyers, not the plaintiffs.
A related but somewhat broader approach for tolling statutes of
limitations seeks to avoid injustice by considering special
circumstances beyond the control of plaintiffs. These “[e]quitable
tolling principles apply in cases where a defendant’s wrongful
conduct, or extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiff’s
226
control prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim timely.”
The
statute of limitations should toll, for example, where plaintiffs have
227
been denied access to other countries’ courts; where defendants
228
were immune from suit during a particular time period; or where
229
there is a genuine fear of reprisals.
A stronger approach to applying equitable principles for
landmine victims is to consider their knowledge or, more accurately,
their lack of knowledge. “The essence of the doctrine of ‘equitable
tolling’ of a statute of limitations is that the statute does not run
230
against a plaintiff who is unaware of his cause of action.” Given the
very nature of many civilians injured by landmines, especially those in
areas where access to the courts or other avenues for relief is either
non-existent or minimal, it seems unjust to deny them a legal remedy
simply because they had no way of knowing they could bring a suit.
Finally, “[u]nder the continuing violation doctrine, ‘the
limitations period for a continuing offense does not begin until the
231
offense is complete.’” Due to the permanent nature of landmines,
in courts that adhere to this equitable tolling principle, the statute of
limitations will not run until all landmines are removed or detonated.
Because this task would take an enormous amount of time, possibly
measured in decades, the victims of landmines would be free to
pursue their claims of relief without being barred by time limitations.

226

Stephanie A. Bilenker, In Re Holocaust Victims’ Assets Litigation: Do the U.S. Courts
Have Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuits Filed by Holocaust Survivors Against the Swiss Banks?,
21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 251, 275 (1997).
227
Id.
228
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996).
229
See Fleischhaker v. Adams, 481 F. Supp. 285, 292 (D.D.C. 1979) (disallowing
tolling where fear of reprisals was subjective); see also Jones v. Sauls Lithograph Co.,
Inc., 1978 WL 27 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1978) (tolling did not apply where plaintiff’s fear
of reprisal was unsubstantiated).
230
Bodner, 2000 WL 1411100, at *15 (quoting Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459
F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)).
231
Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Venture, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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2. Conventional Tort Defenses
The fact situations for landmine victims as potential plaintiffs
would preclude most conventional tort defenses such as consent,
232
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. Even in instances
where landmine victims knew or should have known an area might be
infested with landmines, it seems unlikely that defendant landmine
producers would raise these defenses against the claims of severely
injured landmine victims as a strategic matter in court.
233
Even the tort defense of superceding causes would be difficult
to raise because, in most instances, landmines were used as intended,
and producers knew or should have known that combatants rarely
remove landmines after their military use ends. This defense might
have application where landmines were used to depopulate civilian
areas, such as placement in schools and water supplies, but in that
instance the defense might strengthen plaintiffs’ claims for negligent
entrustment.
3. Governmental Immunity
If landmine victims were to assert tort claims against the U.S.
government, the governmental immunity defense would be a viable
defense for the government. The fact that the U.S. government is
generally free from liability or suit stems from the idea that “the King
234
can do no wrong.” Though this statement does not necessarily ring
true, governmental liability and judicial review of legislative or
235
executive action does present separation of powers problems.
Therefore, governmental immunity offers a way to avoid such
problems. The only way the government could be held liable would
232

“One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
from it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979) (consent defense). The
defense of assumption of the risk applies where a plaintiff is “actually aware of a
reasonable risk and voluntarily undertakes it.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
APPORTIONMENT § 3 cmt. c. Contributory negligence (also called comparative fault)
is where the plaintiff’s “negligence that is a legal cause of an indivisible injury to the
plaintiff reduces the plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to the share of responsibility
the fact finder assigns to the plaintiff.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF APPORTIONMENT § 7.
233
“A superceding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
234
KEETON ET AL., supra note 152, at 1033 (quoting Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Parker, The King Does No Wrong – Liability
for Misadministration,5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952)).
235
See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir.
1998).
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be if the plaintiffs could assert a civil rights violation. In that case, the
government could be held liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
which mandates that the government, in such cases, be treated just as
236
any private individual would be treated.
Nevertheless, it is
improbable that landmine victims could prove civil rights claims
against the United States for the use of or exportation of landmines.
If landmine victims were to assert tort claims against foreign
governments, governmental immunity again would present a viable
defense. Foreign governments are generally immune to suit in U.S.
237
courts under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act.
This is true
238
The only
unless one of the seven enumerated exceptions apply.
provision that may apply to the mine cases is the third clause of the
second exception. That clause says that foreign sovereign immunity
will not attach if the actions at issue occurred outside the territory of
the United States, were in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere, and caused a direct effect in the United
239
States. Family members of landmine victims could bring causes of
action if they argue that the commercial activity carried out by a
foreign government in contracting with landmine producers (foreign
or domestic) caused a direct effect in the United States because that
is where their damages—loss of consortium, emotional distress, etc.—
occurred.

236

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-72, 2674-80 (West 2000).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1330 et seq (West 2000).
238
The exceptions are found in 28 U.S.C.A. section 1605 and include: (1) waiver
of immunity by the foreign government; (2) actions based “upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and causes a
direct effect in the United States”; (3) actions involving the illegal taking of property
in the United States or exchanged for United States property by a foreign state; (4)
rights to United States property are at issue; (5) actions “in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission
of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment;” (6) actions that are “brought either to
enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private
party to submit to arbitration”; (7) actions “in which money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
torture, extra judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 28 U.S.C.A. §
1605 (West 1994).
239
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (a)(2).
237
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4. “Feres-Stencel” Doctrine
Members of the United States Armed Forces injured during
service have no cause of action against the government or the
producers of the products that injured them. This rule of law
240
developed out of two cases, Feres v. United States and Stencel Aero
241
In Feres, the Court held that U.S.
Engineering Corp. v. United States.
servicemen and women could not recover for injuries negligently
242
caused by the government.
In Stencel, the Court extended such
armed services immunity to producers of military equipment when it
held that no recovery could be had even if the producers’ negligence,
243
not the government, caused the injury.
The Feres-Stencel defense is not viable in the landmine cases.
Courts have extended the defense so that derivative claims, such as
birth defects of a child caused by a father’s contamination with Agent
244
Orange, have been rejected under Feres-Stencel. Innocent bystanders
or family members independently injured, however, have been
245
immune to the Feres-Stencel defense. It is likely, therefore, that the
Feres-Stencel doctrine does not apply here since the injured parties are
civilians, not servicemen or women.
5. Government Contractor Defense
The most obvious defense for landmine producers that have
contracted with the U.S. government is the government contractor
defense, which effectively is an extension of sovereign immunity.
This defense would be possible only for potential defendants in the
United States, but not to foreign landmine producers.
The government contractor defense can be used by producers
that contract with the U.S. government to make products intended
for use in armed conflict to shield those producers from liability
246
under the principles of sovereign immunity. The policy behind this
defense is to encourage private producers to contract for what are in
essence government activities, which, if conducted by the
government, otherwise would be protected under sovereign
immunity.
240

340 U.S. 135 (1950).
431 U.S. 666 (1977).
242
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
243
Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
244
See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987).
245
See id. at 161.
246
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988).
241
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a. Elements of the Defense
In the case of landmine manufacturing, the private producers
would need to establish the three elements of the defense and avoid
the four exceptions to the defense. Elements of the government
contractor defense are: (1) “the United States approved reasonablyprecise specifications;” (2) “the equipment conformed to those
specifications”; and (3) “the producer warned the United States
about dangers in the use of the equipment known to the producer
247
but not to the United States.” Landmine producers, in raising the
defense, would assert that the United States provided them with the
specifications with which to develop landmines; that they conformed
their products to those specifications; and, finally, that they warned
the United States about all dangers involved.
Under Boyle v. United Technologies, Corp., the government
contractor defense could prove a viable one unless the plaintiffs can
248
show that at least one of the elements is missing.
The plaintiffs’
best argument here is that the third element, requiring warning to
the United States, is lacking. To succeed, the plaintiffs must proffer
evidence that the self-destruct technology available since 1964 or
earlier was not brought to the attention of the U.S. government.
They must make clear that had the United States known the dangers
of landmines without self-destruct devices, it would have changed its
specifications to include the self-destruct design.
The U.S. experience in Vietnam supports the proposition that it
was not properly warned of such dangers. In Vietnam, landmines
caused thirty-three percent of all U.S. casualties and twenty-eight
249
percent of all U.S. deaths.
There, ninety percent of all mine and
booby-trap components used against U.S. troops were of U.S.
250
origin.
If landmine producers had notified the United States of
safer landmine designs before or during the Vietnam War, it is not
logical that the United States chose to ignore or reject these safer
alternatives that could have reduced the high casualty rates for its
own troops. In this instance, under a strict government contractor
defense analysis, the defense fails because even if precise
specifications were provided and followed, the producers did not
make the United States aware of known dangers.
247

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 501.
Id.
249
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 6.
250
Id. at 6. Another report found that, in Vietnam during 1965, between sixty-five
and seventy percent of United States Marine Corps casualties resulted from
landmines and booby-traps. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 18.
248
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b. Exception to the Defense
In addition to the requirement that producers provide warnings
of the product’s dangers, several other exceptions to the government
contractor defense have developed over time and may help the
landmine victims recover against producers.
The most helpful exception to the government contractor
defense concerns the cost of change versus the cost of accident
analysis. “[I]f the financial burden of changing a product is less than
the accident costs produced by that product, the defendant-producer
will be found negligent for failing to make such reasonable safety
251
alterations.” This exception could prove to be the most helpful in
the landmine cases because there was a safer alternative design since
1964 or earlier. The cost of adding self-detonating devices would
have been far less than the cost of the accidents. This exception
could, therefore, prevent the landmine producers from avoiding
liability via the government contractor defense.
A second exception is that, although the defense is available in
cases of defective design, it does not apply to defective manufacture
252
cases.
This exception may be problematic in this case because to
support their negligence claim, the plaintiffs will assert that the
offending landmines were defectively designed. It would, therefore,
be fatally inconsistent to argue on the one hand a design defect and
on the other a manufacturing defect.
The third exception to the government contractor defense
allows a producer to be held liable when its immunity has been
contracted away. This could occur with an indemnification clause, a
designation of the producer as an independent contractor, or an
insistence that the producer will carry liability. Unless the contracts
involved any of these provisions, this exception is unlikely to apply.
The fourth exception allows producer liability when the
253
producer used its discretion in producing the product.
This
exception is similar to the third element of the government
contractor defense requiring warning to the government of the
dangers. This exception may prove helpful if plaintiffs could show
that the landmine producers used their discretion in not informing
the government of the safer alternative, or in not using the safer
alternative. When decisions are made by the contractor and the

251

Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 179, at 239.
See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990).
But see Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1488-89 (C.D. Cal 1993).
253
Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 179, at 223.
252
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government “merely accepts [such decisions], without any substantive
review or evaluation,” the contractor can be said to be using its
discretion, and thus unable to assert the government contractor
254
defense.
c. Extending the Defense to Landmine Exports
Another issue regarding the government contractor defense is
whether the defense extends to landmines produced in the United
States but exported directly to foreign entities. All arms exports from
the United States, including landmines, are regulated and must be
licensed by the U.S. government through provisions of the Arms
255
Export Control Act. The rules and procedures vary depending on
if the foreign entity (a foreign government or private company) first
256
approaches the U.S. government or the arms producer.
When the foreign entity approaches the U.S. government, the
President of the United States is ultimately responsible for the
supervision of all such contracts, which, once accepted, may then be
257
put out for bidding by U.S. producers.
When the foreign entity directly approaches the U.S. producer,
258
the President remains responsible but the procedures differ. Only
producers that have registered with the U.S. government to export
259
specific items from the “U.S. Munitions List” of defense items may
enter into export contracts. They then must obtain an export license
from the Department of State and, for substantial contracts, approval
of Congress. There is no judicial review of the approval or denial of a
license. Therefore, once the U.S. government denies a producer the
right to export a particular munitions list item, there is no appeal and
the sale can go no further.
When U.S. landmine producers directly contract with foreign
entities, this latter issue regarding the government contractor defense
is implicitly extended to cover the exporting activities because the
U.S. government provided a license. This presents a novel issue for
the courts. Weighing in favor of the immunity extension is the fact
that the U.S. government has ultimate authority over what sales will
be allowed and what items are suitable for export. The policy giving

254

See Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1480; see also Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890
F.2d 698, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1989).
255
22 U.S.C.A. § 2551 et seq. (West 2000).
256
See id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at § 2778.
259
22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1993).
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rise to the defense, however, does not necessarily support such an
extension because arms exporting by private producers appears to be
more a commercial than governmental activity.
Further, the
government contractor defense includes relatively strict guidelines
limiting denial of liability. The extension of the defense to exports
contradicts the apparent intent by broadening the coverage of
immunity to a greater range of activities.
d. Summary of Government Contractor Defense
Applicability
In sum, plaintiffs would have plausible arguments that the
government contractor defense should not shield landmine
producers in the United States, regardless of whether those
producers contracted with the U.S. government or exported directly
to foreign entities under license from the U.S. government. Gauging
the strength of plaintiffs’ arguments is impossible, however, until two
key questions can be answered. First, more factual information is
needed to learn if producers properly notified the government of the
260
danger of not using self-detonating devices as a safer alternative.
Second, regarding arms exports, courts must address the novel legal
issue of whether government licensing implicitly extends the defense
to those transactions.
H. Possible Relief for Landmine Victims
In terms of possible relief for landmine victims, this Article
argues that the need is great and that at least some liability should
rest with the entities that created, profited by, and, quite possibly,
were in a position to have avoided much of the landmine threat to
civilians. Assessing the actual damages suffered by landmine victims
and what relief they might seek is well beyond this Article’s scope.
The following discussion reviews possible approaches and the
difficulties involved.

260

In the alternative, the successful application of the government contractor
defense by landmine producers in the United States—by defendants proving they
had properly notified the U.S. government of safer alternatives—would raise other
potentially troubling questions. This possibility would shift the focus to the U.S.
government regarding its continued specification, use, and export of the more
dangerous mines despite the high casualty rates for U.S. troops in Vietnam and the
highly foreseeable long-term danger for civilians throughout the world. The most
probable defense for the United States in this instance would be sovereign immunity,
as previously discussed. Sovereign immunity by itself could provide a legal defense,
but it would offer little explanation for the government’s decision to ignore or reject
safer alternative landmine designs.
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1. Equitable Remedies
Any plaintiff claiming injury from a product might seek
equitable remedies including injunctions against the continued
manufacture and sale of that product in its dangerous form, removal
of the product from locations where it might cause injury to future
plaintiffs, and destruction of existing inventories of the product. In
the instance of landmines, these are precisely the actions called for
261
under the Mine Ban Treaty (the Treaty).
Organizations currently monitoring for compliance with the
Treaty, as well as investigating landmine production and use
generally indicate that dramatic progress has been made in reducing
or even eliminating landmine production, export, sale, and use in
262
most of the world.
Demining activity has increased, although it
remains dangerous, expensive, and well behind the pace most
263
proponents believe is necessary. Limited stockpile destruction has
264
commenced in some signatory states.
Even if U.S. courts could assert their authority to enforce
equitable remedies regarding landmines, the Treaty as well as the
political and public campaigns accompanying it appears to be
265
accomplishing many of the necessary tasks.
Plaintiff landmine
victims in U.S. courts seeking equitable remedies would find little to
enjoin within the United States. No authority exists to enjoin
activities outside the United States, and the Treaty and accompanying
campaigns already are reducing the landmine threat. In any event,
eliminating landmine production, sale and use, and demining and
261

The “Mine Ban Treaty’s” long title—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction—
addresses its primary functions.
262
See, e.g., MONITOR, supra note 6, at 620 (noting that Germany has destroyed all
of its 1.7 million antipersonnel mines); id. at 685 (noting that the United Kingdom
has already destroyed a “large proportion” of its stockpile).
263
See id.
264
Id.
265
The Landmine Monitor Report states that, at the time of its publication, 135
countries had signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. MONITOR, supra note 6, at
1-2. These countries included virtually all of the European Union, forty of the fortyeight countries in Africa, several of the major producers in Asia, and most of the
heavily mine-affected countries around the world. Notable non-signatories included
the United States—joining Cuba as the only non-signatories in the Western
Hemisphere—and, of the world’s other major producers, Russia, China, India, and
Pakistan. Yet each of these, except Pakistan, had expressed their eventual intention
to sign the Treaty or have stated their support for the ultimate goal of a
comprehensive prohibition. Progress on banning production, trade, and use, as well
as demining, destruction of stockpiles, and other mine action activities, are
documented throughout the report. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 2.
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destroying stockpiles, address the threat to future victims but they
offer nothing for the landmine victims who are the subject of this
Article.
2. Damages
The world’s landmine victims have suffered severe injuries from
their innocent contact with defendant producers’ products. An
accurate estimate of the total monetary damages is neither available
nor realistically possible. Nevertheless, a brief review of how damages
are conventionally valued under U.S. law is instructive. This section
will briefly review the conventional approach in the United States to
valuing damages, and then will attempt to establish the scale,
including only compensation for landmine victims as previously
defined and excluding costs associated with other mine action
266
activities such as demining.
When plaintiffs bring negligence actions, their ultimate goal
typically is to obtain a remedy in the form of monetary damages.
Such monetary relief can be in the form of compensatory damages or
punitive damages. Plaintiffs will be able to recover compensatory
damages for all losses that have proximately resulted from the tort
and all losses that will so result in the future if proven by a
267
preponderance of the evidence.
Punitive damages, “[which]
represent a sum in excess of any compensatory damages . . . are
usually available only when the tortfeasor has committed quite
serious misconduct with a bad intent or bad state of mind such as
268
malice.”
266

Demining cost estimates are substantial. While the number of mines to be
removed is approximately sixty to seventy million, the most accepted method for
estimating demining costs is based on area covered rather than number of mines.
MONITOR, supra note 6, at 17-18. This varies by location, method, and clearance
standards (e.g., the U.N. standard is 99.6 percent clearance). For example, the cost
of mine clearance in Kuwait was about $0.7 billion (and 84 deminers’ lives) for 728
square kilometers, or just under $1 million per square kilometer. In Afghanistan,
the cost was $621,889 per square kilometer. MONITOR, supra note 6, at 18. The
difficulty with this approach is finding an agreement on how much area is to be
demined since not all infested areas necessarily will be demined (e.g., deserts). A
less accurate method uses dollars per mine, which has been widely reported at $300
to $1,000 per mine. Assuming sixty to seventy million landmines, this equals $18 to
$70 billion to demine the world. The United States, with a stated goal “to rid the
world of anti-personnel landmines which pose a threat to civilians by the year 2010,”
leads the world in demining funding, having spent $63 million in 1998 and $58
million in 1999 in 26 countries. TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4.
Assuming U.S. funding continues at this rate, and that the rest of the world matches
the amount, it would take 1,500 years to reach $18 billion.
267
DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000).
268
Id. at 1062.
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a. Compensatory Damages Generally
When determining the compensatory damages due to a plaintiff,
the goal is to “fairly and adequately” calculate the losses he
269
sustained. To do this, it is necessary to look to two types of losses:
tangible and intangible.
Tangible losses, also called pecuniary or liquidated losses, are
those damages that can be calculated mathematically including
270
medical bills, lost wages, and lost earning capacity.
Medical bills
include those “incurred in treating, curing and alleviating the
271
plaintiff’s physical and mental injuries,” including “diagnostic tests,
272
drugs, medical devices and artificial limbs . . . .”
“[It] does not
depend upon whether the plaintiff has actually paid the doctor’s
273
Lost earnings can be recovered “if the plaintiff is wholly or
bills.”
partly unable to carry out gainful activity as a result of tortuously
274
inflicted injury.”
Lost earnings may include actual wages, fringe
275
Lost
benefits, and wages based on expected future advancement.
earning capacity even applies when a plaintiff was not working at the
time of the injury, but because of the injury, will have a diminished
276
earning capacity in the future.
Intangible losses, also referred to as unliquidated damages, may
include pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and future
277
damages.
Recovery for intangible losses is left to the discretion of
the judge or jury. Pain and suffering claims include “any form of
278
conscious suffering, both emotional and physical.” Often, loss of a
body part or loss of a bodily function involve more pain and suffering
than other injuries. Likewise, suffering or embarrassment resulting
from disfigurement rises to the level necessary for substantial
recovery. Loss of enjoyment of life “[permits] recovery for the
279
plaintiff’s mental reactions to pain and to [his] sense of loss.”
Future damages include “(1) [r]esiduals or future effects of an injury
which have reduced the capability of an individual to function as a
whole [person]; (2) future pain and suffering; (3) loss or impairment
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982).
Id.
Id.
DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1049.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435-36.
DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1050.
Id. at 1052.
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of earning capacity; and (4) future medical expenses.”
Each
component must be valued in the context of the community
standards in which the plaintiff resides and, after compensatory
damages are tabulated, they must be adjusted to take into account
281
present value and inflation.
b. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages can only be recovered if compensatory
damages have been recovered. Punitive damages are awarded with
the goal of changing the defendant’s behavior or providing
incentives for others in similar businesses to change their behavior.
To award punitive damages, a court must find circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil
motive on the part of the defendant, or a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others so that his conduct may be called
282
willful or wanton. To calculate punitive damages, judges and juries
have relied upon the following factors: “(1) the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the defendant’s wealth; (3) the
profitability of the misconduct; (4) litigation costs; (5) the aggregate
of all civil and criminal sanctions against the defendant; and (6) the
ratio between the harm caused or potentially caused by the
283
defendant’s misconduct and the losses suffered by the plaintiff.”
Punitive damages are often awarded in cases where defendants
engaging in economic activity cause harm to plaintiffs. In calculating
such damages, the defendant’s financial status will be considered to
284
determine how much money would inflict the proper liability.
For landmine victims, punitive damages would be much more
difficult to recover than compensatory damages. Landmine victims
would need to show that the producers undertook outrageous
conduct or acted with conscious or deliberate disregard for the
interests of others. Such willful and wanton conduct includes a
conscious disregard for the risk to safety of life or property. Here, it

280

Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 436.
See Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super 507, 530-44, 709 A.2d 205,
217-23 (N.J. 1998); see also, DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1058 (citing Jones v. Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983) (using a low interest rate to reduce future
award to present value)); Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (estimating future inflation and increasing the award); Beaulieu v. Elliott,
434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967) (allowing the present value and inflation adjustment to
equal each other).
282
Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 459 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ohio 1983).
283
DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1066-67.
284
See id.
281
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could be argued that producers knew or should have known their
refusal to include self-destruct mechanisms would cause severe
injuries to post-conflict civilians. It would be difficult at best to
succeed with this argument. If punitive damages were awarded,
however, they almost certainly would be meaningful for landmine
victims because the financial wealth of the defendants would be
considered a factor in setting the award amount.
c. Assessing Landmine Victims’ Compensatory Damages
If liability were found, landmine victims presumably could
recover compensatory damages. Punitive damages always would be a
possibility, but are not considered here.
The first component of compensatory damages for landmine
victims is recovery for all medical bills, lost earnings, and lost earning
capacity. As noted previously, the ICBL has estimated the immediate
285
medical care at $9,000 per victim. Add to this figure all continuing
medical costs such as prosthetic re-fittings, at about $125 each for
anywhere up to thirty times (for a child), and the figure easily
286
exceeds $10,000. Other ongoing medical costs such as subsequent
surgeries, therapy and treatments would add at least a few thousand
dollars. A very conservative combined figure might be $15,000 to
cover all emergency medical care, continuing surgeries and medical
care, therapy, prostheses, and related costs.
Lost wages and lost earning capacity are nearly impossible to
compute given the number of victims and the various countries from
which they come. Yet even in developing countries, a victim’s
lifetime of diminished income at the very least ranges from a few to
perhaps tens of thousands of dollars.
Damages for pain and suffering would likely be significant since
the trauma of a landmine injury is substantial. In fact, since many
landmine victims lose appendages, they could be entitled to the
damages associated with such a traumatic loss as well as the potential
stigma arising from disability and disfigurement. Many amputees
suffer throughout their lives with phantom pains and are burdened
with continuing medical treatments for their injuries. Landmine
victims also could be entitled to recover for loss of enjoyment of
many everyday activities, such as familial and social interaction, that
are made substantially more difficult as a result of a disfiguring injury.
285

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 130 (giving figure of $125 per prosthesis
and estimating that a ten year old child with a life expectancy of forty to fifty years
would need twenty-five prostheses).
286
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The incomprehensible terror and suffering associated with
being severely injured by a landmine can hardly be measured
monetarily, but this is the only way for a victim to be compensated.
Putting a number on such suffering is nearly impossible. However, in
lawsuits all over the world, and especially in the United States, this is
what judges and juries do every day—put a monetary number on
injuries for which there cannot possibly be just compensation. For
example, hundreds of lawsuits are filed each year in which a plaintiff
has lost an appendage due to some type of accident. In Cook
County, Illinois, a typical award of damages for a loss of a leg ranges
287
from $800,000 to $1 million.
In non-metropolitan areas of the
United States, this number decreases substantially, but is still
measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars. While it is true that
landmine victims have not been injured in Cook County, Illinois, or
even in the United States, these numbers give an idea of just how
much an appendage is considered to be worth in certain parts of the
United States.
In sum, adding the possible component elements of a lifetime of
medical costs and lost income, but before including intangible losses,
the compensatory damages figure should be an average of at least
$20,000 per landmine victim.
Intangible damages are harder to estimate. What value could be
placed on a landmine victim’s pain and suffering, loss of limb,
disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment? In Cook County,
such a figure could range in millions of dollars. If under U.S. law $1
million or more is a just amount for an individual severely injured in
Cook County, what figures would be appropriate for victims in
Mozambique or Cambodia or any other landmine-infested country?
These questions need not be answered here.
It seems reasonable, however, to suggest that $20,000 would only
begin to compensate a person—regardless of where they might
reside—for the devastation of their life. Assuming the United
Nations estimate of 250,000 amputees as the most conservative
estimate of total landmine victims, total compensatory damages (not
including any intangible losses) would be at least $5 billion.

287

See also Basic Injury Values for Leg Crush Injuries and Amputations, 2 PERSONAL
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK 14, 18-19 (reporting U.S. mean award values of:
$3,164,525 for below the knee amputations, $4,170,346 for above the knee
amputations, and $11,104,955 for bilateral leg amputations; as well as, U.S. mean
settlement values of: $1,053,860 for below the knee amputations, $1,885,747 for
above the knee amputations, and $2,872,027 for bilateral leg amputations).

2003

COMPENSATING LANDMINE VICTIMS

365

Five billion dollars is an overwhelming amount for the
developing countries where most of the sixty to seventy million
uncleared landmines are located. Compared with the thirty-four
countries that exported many of those mines, however, the same $5
billion represents less than 0.1 percent of their combined annual
288
budgets. Although U.S. law does not normally permit considering
relative wealth except with punitive damages, it is impossible to
ignore the inequities in this instance. Landmine victims reside
primarily in the poorest countries of the world and, through no fault
of their own, suffered devastating injuries from landmines. Many of
these mines were manufactured and exported for a profit from the
world’s wealthiest countries. These exporting countries not only can
afford to provide the needed relief on a humanitarian basis, these are
the same exporters who quite possibly could have avoided most of the
victims’ injuries by originally including self-detonating mechanisms in
the mines.
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Most recent budget estimates available for the thirty-four identified landmine
exporting countries, including the United States but excluding China, Iraq, and
Yugoslavia, total more than $5 trillion. CIA, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2000).
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The facts are appalling. Each day new victims are added to the
300,000 men, women and children who have been severely injured
and maimed by an unseen menace. Most of these victims receive
inadequate medical care and little or no long-term therapy. Already
among the poorest people in the world, the devastation to their lives
is unimaginable.
The menace is not an earthquake, flood, or other natural
disaster—just the opposite. Business people and government officials
from thirty-four countries, including the wealthiest countries and
corporations ever known, made the decision to produce and export
anti-personnel landmines. They sold tens of millions of their product
in a competitive market. They designed and enhanced their product
to make it more effective and cheaper. They knew or certainly
should have known that their product would continue to
indiscriminately maim and kill innocent civilians for decades after
serving its intended military purpose.
Could the producers have designed their product to serve its
military purpose but without threatening so many post-conflict
civilians? Evidence suggests the technology was available forty years
ago. If producers had employed this technology, perhaps many of
the world’s 300,000 victims would be whole today and most of the
sixty to seventy million landmines still threatening civilians would not
exist.
Yet if such technology was available that could have avoided so
much injury, suffering and expense, then why was it largely ignored?
Why did producers continue to make and sell millions of cheap,
“dumb” landmines year after year?
The truth of how and why these decisions were made in the
business of producing and selling landmines may never be known
and, in fact, is not really important. The decisions were made. As a
result, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been severely injured
through no fault of their own. A business product directly caused
their injuries, and evidence suggests that the producers knew of a
safer and reasonable alternative that could have avoided many of
those injuries.
Under U.S. law, this fact situation raises several liability theories
through which the victims could receive compensation for their
injuries from the makers of the product. This Article has reviewed
those theories, the possible defenses, the jurisdictional and
procedural matters, and some of the practical aspects. The result is a
complex picture with many issues.
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In terms of substantive law, the primary theories of liability are
fairly straightforward. These are founded on well established policies
under U.S. law. Negligence holds producers liable if their failure to
act with ordinary care caused injury to another. This not only places
the financial burden on the party that caused or could have avoided
the injury, it compensates the victims and it creates an incentive to
provide fundamentally safe products in the future. The theory of
strict liability approaches liability differently. It does not look to
assign blame, but instead focuses on compensating persons injured
by defective or abnormally dangerous products while placing the
costs where they are best able to be absorbed.
Applying these theories to a product that has injured so many
innocent, post-conflict civilians supports the concept of holding
landmine producers liable. What can become confusing, however, is
the fact that landmines were produced for the military purpose of
injuring, or at least threatening to injure, people. This is not
inconsistent with landmines being a product—indeed, they have
been privately and publicly produced, sold and exported in a
competitive world market. It does, however, give rise to a special
defense that extends sovereign immunity to protect military
contractors, the “government contractor defense.” This Article has
explored that defense and found that it does not apply to all
landmine producers and that even in those instances it may not apply
if the producers failed to warn the U.S. government that a safer
alternative was available. Further, the Feres-Stencel defense does not
apply since these victims are post-conflict civilians. Other, more
conventional tort defenses such as contributory negligence or
assumption of risk also do not fit the fact situation.
The greatest difficulties in any case of landmine victims as
plaintiffs against landmine producers as defendants are primarily
jurisdictional, procedural and practical.
Hundreds of thousands of prospective plaintiffs reside in dozens
of countries. They have suffered a wide range of injuries over an
extended period of time from a product made by at least 100
corporations and governmental agencies in thirty-four countries.
While many of these producers are located in or have sufficient
contacts with the United States, and no other legal system in the
world would be better positioned to hear these plaintiffs’ complaints,
U.S. jurisdiction is uncertain. This Article has reviewed the possible
bases for U.S. jurisdiction and several approaches regarding standing.
No single best approach is apparent. Rather, in terms of jurisdiction,
standing and procedural matters, the possibilities are more strategic
and tactical matters, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
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Practical concerns are the most daunting. Information about
landmine producers and their involvement in the trade is hard to
find. Locating and contacting so many plaintiffs who speak a variety
of languages, often live in remote regions, and are accustomed to
different cultures and legal systems would be a monumental task.
Finally, the list of prospective U.S. and foreign defendants would
seem to raise conflicts of interest obstacles for many attorneys, even if
they had the interest and financial wherewithal to represent
predominantly poor foreign nationals on a long, difficult and
speculative campaign.
But returning to the initial goal of compensating the world’s
landmine victims—the theme of justice for these people—should the
largely jurisdictional, procedural and practical difficulties matter?
Did not the landmine producers make decisions that weighed their
business interests against the highly foreseeable and devastating
injuries their products inflicted on 300,000 innocent men, women
and children? Should justice be denied because it is difficult?
One response might indeed argue that, yes, we must face reality
and the effort to remedy some tragedies is too great. But this tragedy
was neither natural nor unavoidable. People, who received money
for their product and quite possibly could have avoided much of the
tragedy, created it. Further, the financial reality is that the remedy’s
cost might require less than 0.1 percent of one year’s revenues from
289
the producers who spread millions of landmines around the world.
Compare that with the everyday reality landmine victims must
confront. Through no fault of their own, these products from Italy
or Singapore or Wisconsin or California have disintegrated their
limbs, embedded debris into their bodies, and blinded, deafened,
burned, and disfigured them. Most victims who survived this trauma,
shock, and massive blood loss then face a dismal future for the
remainder of their lives.
If these victims had been injured in the United States by
defective or abnormally dangerous products, it seems highly unlikely
the U.S. government, courts or people would hesitate to hold the
producers liable regardless of whether those producers were U.S. or
foreign, private or public.
Few would then argue that the
jurisdictional, procedural or practical difficulties were too great.
At this point, the distinction between legal and moral arguments
becomes unclear and perhaps unnecessary. This Article was not
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This figure was calculated based on the combined annual government budgets
of the producing countries.
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intended to promote litigation so much as to suggest that landmine
producers, whose products have caused severe injury to so many
innocent people, can and should be responsible for compensating
those victims.

Of course, if purely humanitarian interests controlled, the best
result would simply have the landmine producers voluntarily join
together and contribute their proportionate shares to a fund for the
world’s landmine victims. This fund would not undo the injuries, but
it could provide adequate care to return them to as productive and
meaningful lives as possible given their devastating injuries. This
Article estimates such a fund at $5 billion for the purposes of
discussion.
Whatever the amount, it is an overwhelming figure for the
countries in which most landmine victims reside; yet it is a
remarkably small cost for the producers who made and exported the
landmines. Measured against the pain, suffering, and devastation
inflicted on 300,000 innocent people, it seems a rare and relatively
inexpensive opportunity to correct one of the world’s greatest
injustices.

